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THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT AND EQUAL




The hope is that the Court will one day hold that the Thirteenth
Amendment has its own equal protection clause or component and
that strict scrutiny will not be used for benign racial classifications
designed to eradicate current badges and incidents of slavery. This
Article critiques the Court’s decision in the Civil Rights Cases re-
garding the scope of section 1 of the Amendment and it offers a holistic
or structural interpretation of the Amendment to include an equal
protection component and a lesser standard of review than strict
scrutiny. Essentially, the Thirteenth Amendment, if properly used,
could become a public policy of equal protection that influences courts’
interpretation of the Amendment, other constitutional provisions,
and statutes.
INTRODUCTION
I. THE COURT’S CURRENT INTERPRETATION OF THE AMENDMENT
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CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
This Article explores ways in which courts can incorporate an
equal protection clause or component into the Thirteenth Amend-
ment and the standards that courts should use when interpreting
claims under the Amendment. Part I is primarily a critique of Justice
Bradley’s majority opinion in the Civil Rights Cases, with a conclu-
sion that a current court should question the value of that opinion
because of Bradley’s possible judicial bias. Part II offers a holistic or
structural approach to incorporating an equal protection clause or
component into the Amendment and discusses various ways in which
such can be done. It also offers a criticism of Congress’s use of section
2 of the Amendment, suggests Congress’s inaction as a reason why
courts should be more willing to broadly interpret section 1 of the
Amendment, and offers a standard that courts should use during their
interpretations. Part III suggests some areas in which the Thirteenth
Amendment could be applied.
I. THE COURT’S CURRENT INTERPRETATION OF THE AMENDMENT
Section 1, the chief substantive portion of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, provides a role for the Court and lower courts to shape and
define the scope of and the remedial effects of the Amendment.1
1. The Thirteenth Amendment provides:
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment
for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within
the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
U.S. Const. amend. XIII, §§ 1–2.
2021] THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT AND EQUAL PROTECTION 463
Although some might fear that the Court, through judicial activism,
will impermissibly invade Congress’s section 2 authority, the Court
is just as likely to be too conservative in its approach to interpreting
the Amendment, as it has been in the past.2 For example, the Court’s
decision in the Civil Rights Cases3 is a narrow interpretation of sec-
tion 1. Whether the Court will continue to value this opinion is an
open issue. However, there is substantial reason for the Court to re-
evaluate the opinion and give the Thirteenth Amendment the judicial
development that it needs.
There are several factors that should motivate the Court’s reinter-
pretation of the Civil Rights Cases, including whether Justice Joseph
P. Bradley, the author of the opinion, was a biased man who allowed
his worldview to improperly influence his opinion in that case.4
A. Judicial Bias
Although the Court does not normally consider whether the
personal biases of its justices improperly influenced an opinion of
the Court, it seems that Justice Joseph R. Bradley, the author of the
Civil Rights Cases, was at best a conflicted person, and at worst a
racist. There is an interesting contrast between his dissenting opinion
in Blyew v. United States,5 and his majority opinion in the Civil
Rights Cases. In Blyew, the Court interpreted section 3 of the Civil
Rights Acts of 1866, which conferred federal jurisdiction over claims
“affecting persons who are denied” any rights under section 1 of the
Act, which in part granted black men the right to testify against white
men in court.6 Justice Strong’s majority opinion held that, despite
that certain black witnesses would not have been allowed to testify
against the white murderers in a Kentucky state court prosecution,
the federal prosecution of the murderers did not fall within section
3’s grant of federal jurisdiction because the “affecting” requirement
2. Such conservatism may lead to courts deferring controversial issues to the poli-
tical process, instead of engaging in proper judicial review. See Palmer v. Thompson, 403
U.S. 217, 227 (1971) (denying a Thirteenth Amendment claim by asserting that Congress
had not exercised its section 2 authority regarding the desegregation of a city-owned
swimming pool); see also Inura Fernando, Litigating Climate Change—Of Politics and
Political Questions: A Comparative Analysis of Justiciability of Climate Change in the
United States and Canada, 49 VICT. UNIV. WELLINGTON L. REV. 315, 322–24 (2018) (dis-
cussing some of the standards that the Court uses to determine whether an issue is a
political question and therefore non-justifiable).
3. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24–25 (1883).
4. See text accompanying infra notes 18–51.
5. See Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S. 581, 598–99, 601 (1871). But see The Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 24–25.
6. See Blyew, 80 U.S. at 581 (emphasis omitted).
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would be established only if the black witnesses themselves were
parties to the prosecution, and not just witnesses.7
In contrast, Justice Bradley noted that the 1866 Act was enacted
under Congress’s section 2 authority, which he interpreted as giving
Congress the authority to eradicate “badges and incidents” of slavery,
and that any state law that prevented a black man from testifying
against a white man, as Kentucky law did, was a badge and incident
of slavery, the eradication of which was within Congress’s section 2
authority.8 His dissenting opinion comes fairly close to stating that
the Thirteenth Amendment itself also proscribes badges and inci-
dents of slavery. He stated:
To conclude, I have no doubt of the power of Congress to pass the
law now under consideration. Slavery, when it existed, extended
its influence in every direction, depressing and disfranchising the
slave and his race in every possible way. Hence, in order to give
full effect to the National will in abolishing slavery, it was neces-
sary in some way to counteract these various disabilities and the
effects flowing from them. Merely striking off the fetters of the
slave, without removing the incidents and consequences of slav-
ery, would hardly have been a boon to the colored race. Hence, also,
the amendment abolishing slavery was supplemented by a clause
giving Congress power to enforce it by appropriate legislation.
No law was necessary to abolish slavery; the amendment did that.
The power to enforce the amendment by appropriate legislation
must be a power to do away with the incidents and consequences
of slavery, and to instate the freedmen in the full enjoyment of that
civil liberty and equality which the abolition of slavery meant.9
The phrase—“full enjoyment of that civil liberty and equality which
the abolition of slavery meant”—strongly shows that, at that time,
Justice Bradley believed that the Thirteenth Amendment itself did
more than just remove the chains from slaves’ legs—or, in Justice
7. In that decision, Justice Strong’s opinion centered on the meaning of “affecting”—
which Justice Strong defined to mean that, to be affected, a black person had to be a
party to a civil or criminal proceeding—relying upon an earlier Court opinion in which
the Court held that a criminal prosecution of one who committed an assault on a foreign
minister, did not “affect” the minister to confer federal jurisdiction under the relevant
federal statute which has similar “affecting” language as section 2 of the 1866 Act. Id.
at 591–95 (citing United States v. Ortega, 24 U.S. 467 (1826)).
8. Id. at 599, 601 (“To deprive a whole community of this right, to refuse their evi-
dence and their sworn complaints, is to brand them with a badge of slavery . . . Merely
striking off the fetters of the slave, without removing the incidents and consequences of
slavery, would hardly have been a boon to the colored race . . . The power to enforce the
amendment by appropriate legislation must be a power to do away with the incidents
and consequences of slavery, and to instate the freedmen in the full enjoyment of that
civil liberty and equality which the abolition of slavery meant.”) (emphasis added).
9. Id. at 601 (emphasis added).
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Bradley’s words, “merely striking off the fetters of the slave”—but
that the Amendment also gave former slaves certain rights after
they left the physical confines of the plantations.10 These rights, if not
conferred directly by the Amendment, were at a minimum achiev-
able by Congress through legislation under its section 2 authority.11
However, about twelve years later, in 1883, Justice Bradley
changed his view on the scope of the Amendment in his majority
opinion in the Civil Rights Cases.12 Whereas his dissenting opinion
in Blyew gave a flicker of hope that the Amendment itself abolished
badges and incidents of slavery, his majority opinion in the Civil Right
Cases narrowly interpreted the scope of section 1 to encompass only
chattel slavery and those disabilities that limited the civil freedom
of slaves and were the crucial or decisive difference between being
a slave and being freed.13 Although his opinion does not attempt an
exhaustive listing of those civil freedoms, he opined that they at
least included the rights that Congress codified in the Civil Rights
Act of 1866—the rights “to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be
parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by
white citizens.”14 Therefore, the public accommodations provision of
the Civil Rights Act was not within the scope of section 1 of the
Thirteenth Amendment, because, in Justice Bradley’s opinion, the
public accommodations provision involved the social rights of citi-
zens, which the Thirteenth Amendment was not intended to regu-
late or proscribe.15 To support that conclusion, he noted that, during
slavery, free blacks were not normally allowed equal public accom-
modations, and therefore, not having equal accommodations was not
an essential feature of slavery.16
From a judicial review standpoint, there is one flaw in Justice
Bradley’s majority opinion—which might be a feature of the infancy
10. Id.
11. The juxtaposition of Justice Strong’s and Justice Bradley’s positions in Blyew is
interesting. In the guise of a statutory interpretation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
Justice Strong’s majority opinion is also an interpretation of the scope of section 1 of the
Thirteenth Amendment—in that his decision allows for Kentucky to continue to use a
state statute to prevent former slaves, and any formerly free black person, from testi-
fying against a white person. This is tantamount to a decision that the Thirteenth
Amendment itself does not provide for equal protection or equal rights of African Ameri-
cans, and that such equal protection could come only from a Congressional enactment
under section 2 of the Amendment. In contrast, Justice Bradley seemed to believe that
the Amendment itself outlawed badges and incidents, although there is some ambiguity
in that conclusion. See id. at 592–93, 601.
12. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20–25 (1883).
13. Id. at 21–22.
14. Id. at 16.
15. Id. at 22.
16. Id. at 25.
466 WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST. [Vol. 27:461
of the Court’s development of judicial precedent, but it is a flaw that
would not be tolerated today—he cited absolutely no legal sources
or authority for any of his conclusions about the permissible scope
of section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment. He made no reference to
any type of legislative history or other available sources that would
have shown the various statements or other intentions of the Fram-
ers of the Thirteenth Amendment, which would have offered him
some ideas about the intended scope of the Amendment. At best, he
used some type of judicial notice of the differences between a free
person and a slave, and the essential rights and freedom of each.17
17. This apparent judicial notice is shown in Bradley’s statements:
The long existence of African slavery in this country gave us very distinct
notions of what it was, and what were its necessary incidents. Compulsory
service of the slave for the benefit of the master, restraint of his movements
except by the master’s will, disability to hold property, to make contracts, to
have a standing in court, to be a witness against a white person, and such
like burdens and incapacities were the inseparable incidents of the institution.
Severer punishments for crimes were imposed on the slave than on free
persons guilty of the same offenses. Congress, as we have seen, by the Civil
Rights Bill of 1866, passed in view of the [T]hirteenth [A]mendment, before
the [F]ourteenth was adopted, undertook to wipe out these burdens and
disabilities, the necessary incidents of slavery, constituting its substance
and visible from; and to secure to all citizens of every race and color, and
without regard to previous servitude, those fundamental rights which are
the essence of civil freedom, namely, the same right to make and enforce
contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to inherit, purchase, lease, sell,
and convey property, as is enjoyed by white citizens. Whether this legislation
was fully authorized by the [T]hirteenth [A]mendment alone, without the
support which it afterwards received from the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment,
after the adoption of which it was re-enacted with some additions, it is not
necessary to inquire. It is referred to for the purpose of showing that at that
time (in 1866) Congress did not assume, under the authority given by the
[T]hirteenth [A]mendment, to adjust what may be called the social rights
of men and races in the community; but only to declare and vindicate those
fundamental rights which appertain to the essence of citizenship, and the
enjoyment or deprivation of which constitutes the essential distinction
between freedom and slavery.
We must not forget that the province and scope of the [T]hirteenth and
[F]ourteenth [A]mendments are different: the former simply abolished
slavery: the latter prohibited the States from abridging the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States, from depriving them of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, and from denying to any the
equal protection of the laws. The amendments are different, and the powers
of Congress under them are different. What Congress has power to do under
one, it may not have power to do under the other. Under the [T]hirteenth
[A]mendment, it has only to do with slavery and its incidents. Under the
[F]ourteenth [A]mendment, it has power to counteract and render nugatory
all state laws and proceedings which have the effect to abridge any of the
privileges or immunities which have the effect to abridge any deprive them
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or to deny to any of
them the equal protection of the laws. Under the [T]hirteenth [A]mendment
the legislation, so far as necessary or proper to eradicate all forms and
incidents of slavery and involuntary servitude, may be direct and primary,
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operating upon the acts of individuals, whether sanctioned by State legisla-
tion or not; under the [F]ourteenth, as we have already shown, it must neces-
sarily be, and can only be, corrective in its character, addressed to counteract
and afford relief against State regulations or proceedings.
The only question under the present head, therefore, is, whether the
refusal to any persons of the accommodations of an inn, or a public convey-
ance, or a place of public amusement, by an individual, and without any
sanction or support from any State law or regulation, does inflict upon such
persons any manner of servitude, or form of slavery, as those terms are
understood in this country? Many wrongs may be obnoxious to the prohibi-
tions of the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment which are not, in any just sense,
incidents or elements of slavery. Such, for example, would be the taking of
private property without due process of law; or allowing persons who have
committed certain crimes (horse stealing, for example) to be seized and
hung by the posse comitatus without regular trial; or denying to any person,
or class of persons, the right to pursue any peaceful avocations allowed to
others. What is called calss [sic] legislation would belong to this category,
and would be obnoxious to the prhibitions [sic] of the [F]ourteenth [A]mend-
ment, but would not to the prohibitions of the [F]ourteenth when not involving
the idea of any subjection of one man to another. The [T]hirteenth [A]mend-
ment has respect, not to distinctions of race, or class, or color, but to slavery.
The [F]ourteenth [A]mendment extends its protection to races and classes,
and prohibits any State legislation which has the effect of denying to any
race or class, or to any individual, the equal protection of the laws.
Now, conceding, for the sake of the argument, that the admission to an
inn, a public conveyance, or a place of public amusement, on equal terms
with all other citizens, is the right of every man and all classes of men, is it
any more than one of those rights which the states by the [F]ourteenth
[A]mendment are forbidden to deny to any person? And is the [C]onsitution
[sic] violated until the denial of the right has some state sanction or authority?
Can the act of a mere individual, the owner of the inn, the public conveyance,
or place of amusement, refusing the accommodation, be justly regarded as
imposing any badge of slavery or servitude upon the applicant, or only as
inflicting an ordinary civil injury, properly cognizable by the laws of the state,
and presumably subject to redress by those laws until the contrary appears?
After giving to these questions all the consideration which their impor-
tance demands, we are forced to the conclusion that such a act of refusal has
nothing to do with slavery or involuntary servitude, and that if it is violative
of any right of the party, his redress is to be sought under the laws of the
state; or, if those laws are adverse to his rights and do not protect him, his
remedy will be found in the corrective legislation which [C]ongress has
adopted, or may adopt, for counteracting the effect of state laws, or state
action, prohibited by the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment. It would be running
the slavery argument into the ground to make it apply to every act of dis-
crimination which a person may see fit to make as to the guests he will
entertain, or as to the people he will take into his coach or cab or car, or
admit to his concert or theater, or deal with in other matters of intercourse or
business. Innkeepers and public carriers, by the laws of all the states, so far
as we are aware, are bound, to the extent of their facilities, to furnish proper
accommodation to all unobjectionable persons who in good faith apply for
them. If the laws themselves make any unjust discrimination, amenable to
the prohibitions of the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment, [C]ongress has full power
to afford a remedy under that [A]mendment and in accordance to it.
When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of beneficent leg-
islation has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state, there
must be some stage in the progress of his elevation when he takes the rank
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Perhaps, the use of legislative history and other evidence of congres-
sional intent was not pervasive during Justice Bradley’s time on the
Court—which might give him a pass for taking judicial notice of his
own beliefs and thoughts but should not give him any deference
when courts are evaluating congressional intent regarding the scope
of section 1 of the Amendment.
And, that Justice Bradley’s majority opinion in the Civil Rights
Cases is not supported by legislative history, and prior Court prece-
dent, raises questions about whether his own biases colored his judi-
cial notice conclusions about the scope of the Amendment. There are
three conflicting things about Justice Bradley’s life that raise concerns
about the value of his majority opinion in the Civil Rights Cases.
First, after his dissenting opinion in Blyew in 1871, he was ap-
pointed as the swing member of the Electoral Commission whose
mission was to vote on whether Hayes or Tilden should win the presi-
dential election of 1876.18 Being the swing vote, both Republicans
and the Democrats lobbied for his vote for their party’s candidate,
with some partisans visiting Bradley at his home on the night before
his vote, which may have caused him to change how he would vote.19
Being a Republican, he eventually voted for Hayes,20 which enraged
of a mere citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite of the laws, and when
his rights as a citizen, or a man, are to be protected in the ordinary modes by
which other men’s rights are protected. There were thousands of free colored
people in this country before the abolition of slavery, enjoying all the essen-
tial rights of life, liberty, and property the same as white citizens; yet no one,
at that time, thought that it was any invasion of their personal status as
freemen because they were not admitted to all the privileges enjoyed by white
citizens, or because they were subjected to discriminations in the enjoyment
of accommodations in inns, public conveyances, and places of amusement.
Id. at 22–25.
18. See Benjamin C. Block, Bradley, Breyer, Bush and Beyond: The Legal Realism of
Legal History, 15 U. FLA. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 57, 68–70 (2003).
19. Id. at 70–71.
20. Id. at 70. One scholar made the following statement about Bradley’s involvement
on the Electoral Commission:
Under the national compromise reached in 1877, “[t]he South agreed to
cooperate with the election of [Rutherford B.] Hayes; [and] the North agreed
to abandon its reconstruction aims and to renounce any further role in
protecting and enforcing the rights of the freedman.” During the critical
weeks before the compromise, Congress established the Electoral Commission
to decide disputed returns. Included on the Commission were four Supreme
Court Justices empowered to choose a fifth. Bradley was selected, becoming
the fifteenth member of the Commission. “By a straight party vote, 8 [Repub-
licans]–7 [Democrats], the electoral votes of [the disputed returns in Florida,
Louisiana, Oregon, and South Carolina] were awarded to the Republicans,”
securing the presidency for Hayes “by a single [electoral] vote—185–184.”
Questions about Bradley’s integrity on this issue were entwined with doubts
as to his independence on the court. The collaboration between Chief Justice
Waite and Justice Bradley has been examined for its possible taint of political
expediency: the Chief Justice’s choice of Bradley for the Commission because
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some of the Democrats, leading to Bradley’s being excoriated in the
press.21 There were several conspiracy theories about whether he
had acted improperly in casting his vote, including an allegation
that he may have sold his vote for $200,000.22 Given the substantial
criticism and bad press that he received, he even felt compelled to
write a response to explain his vote.23 However, the controversy
persisted.24 We may never know the real truth regarding Bradley’s
role and action on the electoral commission.
Second, Bradley may have harbored racist and sexist views.25
There is no doubt that his supporters could say that he was just a
man of his time. But, an opposing acknowledgment could be that so
was Justice Harlan a man of his time, yet in his dissenting opinion
in the Civil Rights Cases he still argued for a broader interpretation
of the Thirteenth Amendment to include the badges and incidents
of slavery.26 But unlike Harlan’s opinion, Bradley’s opinion in the
Civil Rights Cases appears to have been based on his pre-existing,
very limited understanding of “equality” as stated in the Declaration
of Independence.27 In other words, instead of Jefferson’s intent to
apply the concept to all white men,28 Bradley never thought that
he would “rubber stamp the sectional compromise.” If, as has been theorized,
Chief Justice Waite engineered Bradley’s selection to the Electoral Commis-
sion with the understanding that Bradley would act on behalf of Rutherford
Hayes, consequences at the executive level were predictable—Hayes would be
elected; consequences for the Supreme Court were intimated—Bradley would
acquiesce in the compromise by retreating from his reconstruction positions.
Regardless of impulse, the Supreme Court declined to recognize federal au-
thority in protecting the rights of persons of color. What remained was an
unenforceable amendment glorifying the citizenship of persons recently
enslaved. The legislation that Congress had produced over nearly a decade
could find no objective beyond its own temporary existence. It was the legis-
lation alone that “represented the post-war apex in federal accounting for
civil rights.”
Aremona G. Bennett, Phantom Freedom: Official Acceptance of Violence to Personal
Security and Subversion of Proprietary Rights and Ambitions Following Emancipation,
1865–1910, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 439, 484–85 (1994).
21. Block, supra note 18, at 70.
22. Id. at 70–71.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 71–73.
25. Nedim Novakovic, Note, Access to Justice: Reducing The Implicit Pushback
Burden on Working-Class Pro Se Plaintiffs in Employment Law Cases, 104 CAL. L. REV.
545, 546 (2016) (discussing Bradley’s sexist attitudes about women).
26. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 34–36 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice
Harlan is a good example that it is not the times that are important, but the man (perhaps
the inner man) that is really important, and that some men in the same time can be more
heroic than others. Id.
27. HON. JOSEPH P. BRADLEY, MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF THE LATE HON. JOSEPH
P. BRADLEY 90–93 (William Draper Lewis, A.Q. Keasbey & Charles Bradley eds., 1901).
28. See id. at 90.
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even all white men were equal. At least one of his essays offers insight
into his concept of equality. He stated:
Does it mean social eqality? [sic] Such a state would make all
the classes (I do not say orders) of society commingle their inter-
course; would introduce the cobbler into the most elegant drawing
room to take a cup of tea with the gayest belle of the town, or else,
perhaps, to debate with grave Senators on the affairs of State.
Could this have been meant? Certainly not. This is the least pos-
sible of all meanings that could be attached to the term. Men will
choose their own company in whatever state of society you may
choose to place them. This is the last vestige of liberty with which
they are willing to part, and any state of society which forbids a
man this privilege, I shall neither contend for nor against.29
Bradley’s reference to social equality is too limiting because he
used an example involving only the social contact of choosing whether
to invite someone into your home for tea or a conversation.30 In his
argument, he did not consider public accommodations that are less
intimate and less objectionable than being forced to invite someone
into your home. In any event, it is reasonable to believe that Bradley’s
objection to social equality was operating when he opined in his
majority opinion in the Civil Right Cases that anti-racial discrimi-
nation in public accommodations was not within the scope of the
Thirteenth Amendment.31 Although Bradley did not discuss social
equality in the context of public accommodations, holding that the
Thirteenth Amendment mandated such would have been against
the principle of equality that he discussed in his essay on equality
under the Declaration of Independence.32 In his majority opinion in
the Civil Rights Cases, he asserted:
It would be running the slavery argument into the ground to
make it apply to every act of discrimination which a person may
see fit to make as to the guests he will entertain, or as to the
people he will take into his coach or cab or car, or admit to his
concert or theater, or deal with in other matters of intercourse
or business. Innkeepers and public carriers, by the laws of all the
States, so far as we are aware, are bound, to the extent of their
facilities, to furnish proper accommodation to all unobjectionable
persons who in good faith apply for them. If the laws themselves
make any unjust discrimination, amenable to the prohibitions of
29. Id. at 91–92.
30. See id.
31. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 24–25.
32. See BRADLEY, supra note 27, at 90–92.
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the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment, [C]ongress has full power to afford
a remedy under that amendment and in accordance with it.33
In his essay, Bradley eventually concluded that in the Declara-
tion of Independence equality means political equality: “In what,
then, can this political equality consist? Does it consist in each man
having an equal voice in the civil government of his country? This
is what I conceive it to be. But this is exercised originally, and only
so.”34 He goes on to explain that such political equality—the right to
vote on an equal basis—exists only in its original form in that after
one exercises his equal political power to elect a leader or to enact a
constitution, he no longer has equal political power because a certain
portion of that power is passed on to the leader or the constitution.35
The essay does not explain the role that free African Americans
played in Bradley’s political equality definition of equality, but it may
be reasonable to assume that, in his opinion, and given his definition
of political equality, that they were not equal under the Declaration
of Independence and the U.S. Constitution until the passage of the
Fifteenth Amendment, which attempted to give African Americans
the right to vote.36
Third, and more importantly, it should be noted that Bradley
was not an “abolitionist”; and that he described himself as being a
“conservative of the conservatives” on the slave issue.37 He was even
critical of some Republicans who took a more radical view in support
of ending slavery.38 During his run for Congress in 1862, he empha-
sized in several speeches that he was for compromise with the
southern states on the slave issue, and that his primary support for
the Civil War was to preserve the Union and not to end slavery.39
And that his support for the War, and against compromise with the
Confederate States, was only after the South attacked the Union at
Fort Sumter, after which he was in full support of the War and of a
Union victory at all costs.40 Bradley also was involved in formally
33. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 24–25.
34. BRADLEY, supra note 27, at 92.
35. See id. In Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 391–94 (1978), Justice Marshall
referenced Bradley’s majority opinion in the Civil Rights Cases and was critical of the
harmful effects of the opinion and of some of Bradley’s statements therein.
36. The Fifteenth Amendment provides: “The right of citizens of the United States
to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account
of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” U.S. CONST. amend XV, § 1.
37. See BRADLEY, supra note 27, at 130 (quoting Bradley: “You know that I never was
an abolitionist. [Laughter.] You know that I was always a conservative of the conserva-
tives.”).
38. Id. at 107.
39. Id. at 113–14.
40. See id.
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trying to broker a compromise with the Southern States before the
War started.41 Part of his compromise included his proposed Thir-
teenth Amendment to the Constitution, which would have allowed
then-existing southern states to continue slavery in their boundaries
and, if any new states were created in the Northwest Territory, it
would have allowed those states to institute slavery within their
boundaries after twenty years.42 It also would have provided for the
return of fugitive slaves to their masters in the southern states and
for compensation from the county into which they had fled if the
fugitive slaves were not returned.43
Despite Bradley’s questionable background, some have attempted
to cast his earlier opinions as being in furtherance of the Republican
party’s anti-slavery tradition, by pointing to various periods in his
life and certain of his opinions.44 While others have, instead of labeling
him as a promoter of Republican viewpoints, noted that he was in a
position of knowing the viewpoints and intentions of the Republican
Congressmen who framed the Thirteenth Amendment—with one
possible inference being that his majority opinion in the Civil Rights
Cases and his dissenting opinion in the Slaughter-House Cases were
based on that understanding and not on his own personal viewpoints
and philosophy.45 Other scholars have pointed to additional facts to
show that he had a real understanding of the Framers’ intent.46
But, it is somewhat odd in 2020 to be relying on such tenuous fac-
tors to determine whether Bradley knew the real intent of the Fram-
ers of the Thirteenth Amendment when he rendered his dissenting
opinion in Blyew and his majority opinion in the Civil Rights Cases.
Furthermore, there are other factors that support a conclusion that
he may have not been trying to promote a Republican anti-slavery
41. See id. at 146.
42. See id. at 99.
43. See BRADLEY, supra note 27, at 99.
44. See Richard L. Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom: Justice Miller, The
Fourteenth Amendment, and the Slaughter-House Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 627,
671–74 (1994).
45. See id. at 672–74. Along that line, one writer points to the following things: (1)
Bradley’s uncle Theodore Frelinghuysen, under whom he read the law, argued a New
Jersey anti-slavery case in that state’s Supreme Court; (2) that Bradley was married to
the daughter of Chief Justice Hornblower, who rendered the opinion in the New Jersey
anti-slavery case (with the inference that this background connection could have in-
fluenced his thinking in his dissenting opinion in Blyew); (3) that he had authored
several of the lower court opinions in the Slaughter-House Cases; (4) that he “possessed,
enunciated, and made widely known, a theory of the Wartime Amendments that classified
him, ideologically, among the radical Republican”; and (5) that “intent of the Fourteenth
Amendment and its ideological underpinnings were widely known and Bradley was in
a position to apply them.” Id. at 672–74.
46. See Jonathan Lurie, Mr. Justice Bradley: A Reassessment, 16 SETONHALLL.REV.
343, 356–57, 359–60 (1986).
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philosophy. First, he either supported slavery or he was not against
it. This is clearly shown by his speeches and his efforts to reach com-
promise with the South, including his proposed Thirteenth Amend-
ment that would have allowed the South not only to keep its slaves
but to introduce slavery into the new territories.47 And his writings
show that he was very critical of those “radical Republicans” who took
a more aggressive view in favor of abolishing slavery.48
Second, he simply did not believe in the “social equality” of men,
as shown by his interpretation of “equality” in the Declaration of
Independence.49 And, in the Civil Rights Cases, it appears that he
sought to further that belief as he seemed to have been mostly con-
cerned with furthering the rights of white people to maintain a
separation from and a segregation of black people.50
The simple notion of this Article is that Bradley’s interpretation
of the Thirteenth Amendment in the Civil Rights Cases should not
be given any deference. This is so because he does not cite any legisla-
tive history or other sources to support his interpretation of the
Amendment. Scholars’ assumptions about what he probably knew or
did not know about the Amendment Framers’ intent are not suffi-
cient to bolster the value of his majority opinion in that case. Because
of Bradley’s support for slavery and his willingness to compromise
the slaves’ rights—so that they would have forever remained
enslaved—should cause the current Supreme Court to undertake a
new analysis of the scope of section 1 to determine whether section 1
of the Amendment also proscribes “badges and incident” of slavery.
However, given the Court’s adherence to stare decisis, it is un-
certain how the current Court would approach Bradley’s opinion in
the Civil Rights Cases. In one of its more recent cases, Jones v.
Mayer,51 the Court gave mixed signals on what, if any, value Bradley’s
opinion has.
B. Influence of Bradley and the Civil Rights Cases
A possible motivating factor in the Court’s willingness to still
give value to Bradley’s majority opinion is that the case was decided
by justices who, because of the closeness in time to the enactment
of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, are believed to have
some special insight about the motivation of the Framers’ intent in
enacting the Civil War Amendments. The Court has stated:
47. See BRADLEY, supra note 27, at 98–99, 107, 113–14, 130.
48. See id. at 107.
49. See text accompanying supra notes 29–30.
50. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 23–25 (1883).
51. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 441 (1968).
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The force of the doctrine of stare decisis behind these decisions
stems not only from the length of time they have been on the
books, but also from the insight attributable to the Members of
the Court at that time, who all had intimate knowledge and famil-
iarity with the events surrounding the Amendment’s adoption.52
However, the Court’s decision in Jones v. Mayer is encouraging
and instructive. The case involved whether Congress, under its sec-
tion 2 powers, had the authority to outlaw racial discrimination in
the sale of real property.53 For the theme of this Article, there are
two important aspects of the Court’s opinion. First, regarding the
scope of the Thirteenth Amendment, the Court relied on Justice
Bradley’s opinion in the Civil Rights Cases and quoted from the opin-
ion: “‘By its own unaided force and effect,’ the Thirteenth Amendment
‘abolished slavery, and established universal freedom.’”54 The Jones
Court did not go beyond this brief quote. Therefore, it is not clear
whether the current Court will rely on Bradley’s opinion to further
restrict the scope of section 1 to only those rights which Congress
identified in the Civil Rights statute that Bradley interpreted.55
Furthermore, although Bradley opined that the Amendment
“established universal freedom,” it is clear that he did not include
the equal treatment of freed black people within the scope of or pro-
tection of universal freedoms, especially regarding private racial
discrimination, which his Civil Rights Cases opinion held that Con-
gress, even under its section 2 authority, did not have the authority
to proscribe.56 So, Bradley would have limited the scope of the Thir-
teenth Amendment to allow freed blacks to be relegated to second-
class citizenship and status.57 Such would be consistent with his
idea that equality under the Declaration of Independence should not
include social equality.
The second aspect of Jones is that the Court appeared to give a
broader scope to Congress’s authority under section 2. The Court
stated:
Whether or not the Amendment itself did any more than that—a
question not involved in this case—it is at least clear that the
Enabling Clause of that Amendment empowered Congress to do
much more. For that clause clothed “Congress with power to pass
52. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 599 (2000).
53. See Jones, 392 U.S. at 412.
54. Id. at 439 (citing The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883)).
55. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 22.
56. See id. at 17, 20.
57. See id. at 22–25.
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all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and inci-
dents of slavery in the United States.”58
It seems that the only limitation is that Congress’s determination
as to what is a badge or incident of slavery must be reasonable or
rationally related to some disability stemming from racial discrimi-
nation against at least African Americans; therefore, racial discrimi-
nation that prevented the sale of real property to African Americans
was a badge and incident of slavery, and section 1982 was not un-
constitutional nor beyond Congress’s section 2 powers.59
In reaching this conclusion, unlike Bradley in the Civil Rights
Cases, the Jones Court relied on its extensive study of the legislative
history of section 1982.60 The Court’s relying on legislative history
at least gives some objective way for one to evaluate the merits of
the Court’s reasoning, without having to give any credit or deference
to the Court’s closeness in time to the Congress that enacted section
1982 and any of its former versions.
Furthermore, the Court recognized that some of the Congress-
men who were involved in the enactment of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment and in the various versions of section 1982 might have been
duplicitous and might have made bogus arguments to obfuscate or
otherwise obstruct a true understanding of Congress’s intent regard-
ing the scope of section 1982.61
58. Jones, 392 U.S. at 439 (emphasis added).
59. See id. at 413, 441 (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 22).
60. See id. at 422, 427, 429, 431, 433, 435–36.
61. See id. at 439–40.
Those who opposed passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 argued in effect
that the Thirteenth Amendment merely authorized Congress to dissolve the
legal bond by which the Negro slave was held to his master. Yet many had
earlier opposed the Thirteenth Amendment on the very ground that it would
give Congress virtually unlimited power to enact laws for the protection of
Negroes in every State. And the majority leaders in Congress—who were,
after all, the authors of the Thirteenth Amendment—had no doubt that its
Enabling Clause contemplated the sort of positive legislation that was em-
bodied in the 1866 Civil Rights Act. Their chief spokesman, Senator Trumbull
of Illinois, the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, had brought the Thir-
teenth Amendment to the floor of the Senate in 1864. In defending the
constitutionality of the 1866 Act, he argued that, if the narrower construction
of the Enabling Clause were correct, then
“the trumpet of freedom that we have been blowing throughout the
land has given an ‘uncertain sound,’ and the promised freedom is a de-
lusion. Such was not the intention of Congress, which proposed the
constitutional amendment, nor is such the fair meaning of the amend-
ment itself . . . I have no doubt that under this provision . . . we may
destroy all these discriminations in civil rights against the black man;
and if we cannot, our constitutional amendment amounts to nothing.
It was for that purpose that the second clause of that amendment was
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The relevance of the Jones Court’s reference to how different
Congressmen attempted to change their arguments from the ones
they made during the debate of the Thirteenth Amendment to the
ones they made during Congress’s subsequent enactment of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, is that—even if one were to believe in Bradley’s
closeness-in-time position of understanding the Framers’ intent—
there is no indication of which Congressmen’s arguments or positions
influenced him. During some of his speeches prior to the start of the
Civil War, he expressed disdain for the Radical Republicans who were
in favor of ending slavery;62 instead, Bradley labeled himself as a
“conservative” who did not want to deprive the South of its slaves.63
There is no indication that Bradley, even if he knew the real intent of
the Thirteenth Amendment’s framers, would have been willing to give
force to such intent in his court opinions, especially in his Civil Rights
Cases opinion, given his unwillingness to accept their arguments dur-
ing the debate over slavery before the start of the Civil War.
Therefore, just as the Jones Court did not rely on Bradley’s
understanding regarding the scope of Congress’s section 2 authority,
nor should a modern-day court rely upon Bradley’s Civil Rights Cases
opinion to in any way define or limit the scope of section 1 of the
Thirteenth Amendment.
II. A HOLISTIC OR STRUCTURAL INTERPRETATION OF THE CIVIL WAR
AMENDMENTS AND THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT
The general proposition is that the Civil War Amendments should
be read as a unit and when ambiguity exists in one it can be resolved
by relying on principles expressed in the other amendments, especially
regarding the principle of equal protection. Some would label this type
of reasoning a holistic approach to constitutional interpretation.64
adopted, which says that Congress shall have authority, by appropriate
legislation, to carry into effect the article prohibiting slavery. Who is to
decide what that appropriate legislation is to be? The Congress of the
United States; and it is for Congress to adopt such appropriate legislation
as it may think proper, so that it be a means to accomplish the end.”
Id.
62. See BRADLEY, supra note 27, at 107.
63. See Lurie, supra note 46, at 348–49.
64. See Vicki C. Jackson, Holistic Interpretation: Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer and Our Bifur-
cated Constitution, 53 STAN.L.REV. 1259, 1267 (2001) (“Rather than justify the cleavage
that exists under the Court’s current Eleventh Amendment doctrine, I want to suggest
that Fitzpatrick illustrates the possibilities of a more holistic form of constitutional
interpretation in which parts of the Constitution adopted at different time periods are
read together to create a principle with respect to the former parts that differs from the
reading those parts previously had. Fitzpatrick, in a sense, gives the Fourteenth Amend-
ment more ‘weight’ in interpretation than the Eleventh Amendment.”). For other
scholarship favoring a structural interpretation of the Constitution, see Zephyr Teachout,
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This Article labels it as a structural approach to interpreting the
Thirteenth Amendment.
There are two general propositions. First, the Thirteenth Amend-
ment should be interpreted as having its own equal protection clause.
Second, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause
establishes a constitutional policy of equal protection that should
inform and be applicable to racial discrimination issues that are
pursued under the Thirteenth Amendment.
A. Its Own Equal Protection Clause
Although it is not debatable that the Fourteenth Amendment
does have an equal protection clause, one might assert that neither
the Thirteenth Amendment nor the Fifteenth Amendment has an
equal protection clause. But, a reasonable inference would show
otherwise. The Thirteenth Amendment ended slavery so that black
people would be treated as equally as white people, at least to the
extent that an unequal system of enslaving only black people could
no longer exist. As such, the Thirteenth Amendment’s anti-slavery
provision grants equal protection to African Americans.65 The only
open issue is how far this grant of equal protection extends. Some
would argue that it extends only to the point of ending the physical
bonds of slavery. Others, like this writer, argue that it also extends
to certain “incidents” and “badges” of slavery. Even if one were to
The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 369, 397 (2009) (discussing an
anti-corruption principle as a structural means of constitutional interpretation); see also
Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism,
and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 949 (2002) (offering the history of women’s
struggle for the vote as a means of understanding and interpreting claims of sex
discrimination). For a discussion that the Constitution should be read as a whole and that
the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause should be used to interpret the Bill
of Rights Amendments, see Gabriel J. Chin and Charles J. Vernon, Reasonable but
Unconstitutional: Racial Profiling and the Radical Objectivity of Whren v. United States,
83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 882, 919 (2015) (“[T]he Court has followed this approach. First,
the protections of the Bill of Rights are read in light of the Fourteenth Amendment. They
generally contain a nondiscrimination principle, often explicitly based on Fourteenth
Amendment precedents.”). These scholars cite some of the well-known proponents of a
structural interpretation of the Constitution. Id. at 918–19 (“A range of modern scholars,
such as Charles Black, John Hart Ely, Laurence Tribe, Akhil Amar, and Vicki Jackson,
have argued against constitutional interpretation that treats clauses of the document
in isolation. Their argument is a compelling one: The Constitution was adopted as a
whole (and its subsequent amendments operate against the backdrop of that whole), and
its various parts are most sensibly read if they are construed together.”). For a detailed
discussion of some of the principles and factors that courts should consider when de-
ciding whether to adopt a structural interpretation, see Michael Coenen, Combining
Constitutional Clauses, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1067, 1098–99 (2016).
65. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
98 (1980) (asserting that the Thirteenth Amendment “surely significantly reflects a concern
with equality as well”).
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accept the limited interpretation of Justice Bradley—that section 1
of the Thirteenth Amendment covers only the items specified in the
Civil Rights Act of 186666—he or she would have to further acknowl-
edge that equal protection is granted by section 1 to the extent of
those items.
And, if one further follows Bradley’s logic that section 1 of the
Amendment granted only the rights listed in the Civil Rights Act of
1866, because they were “incidents” of slavery in that these were the
things that were inflicted on slaves that could not legally be inflicted
on free white men and free black men, then one is left with the
possibility that Bradley’s list might not be complete, because there
were other things that slaves could not do or that they were forced to
endure because they were slaves and not free. These things included:
sexual abuse, including rape; forced pregnancy to produce children
who could be sold to another plantation; preventing education, in-
cluding learning how to read; preventing religious services to mini-
mize possible discussion of rebellion; whippings as punishments;
being subjected to harsh working conditions; being forced to “uncon-
ditional submission”; mental torture to cause slaves to feel that they
were intellectually and otherwise inferior; being forced to live in a
constant state of fear; having restrictions placed on their ability to
travel; being subject to fugitive slave laws that allowed slaves to be
returned back to their masters; being frequently forced to eat sub-
standard food; being frequently supplied with inadequate medical
treatment without any recourse; being unable to socialize with whites
on an equal basis; being unable to work for wages on an equal basis
as whites; and being subject to murder for any small infraction.67 All
of these were incidents of slavery, which under Bradley’s rationale,
should be included within the scope of section 1 of the Amendment
to the same extent as the rights that are listed in the Civil Rights
Act of 1866.
In sum, the above listed unequal treatments were inflicted on
slaves because of their status as property—which is a different
status than that of freed African Americans who, although discrimi-
nated against, were not subject to the same level of punishment and
discriminatory treatment that slaves were.
If these additional “incidents” are indeed within the scope of
section 1 of the Amendment, then, in outlawing them, the Amend-
ment grants at least former slaves and their descendants equal
protection against these acts of unequal treatment.
66. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 16 (1883).
67. See People and Events, Condition of Antebellum Slavery 1830–1860, PBS, https://
www.pbs.org/wgbh/aia/part4/4p2956.html [http://perma.cc/F4P9-UQ8S].
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B. Legislative History of Equal Protection
Elsewhere, this author has discussed the Amendment’s legisla-
tive history with an emphasis on highlighting statements that show
a broad understanding of the Amendment, including an understand-
ing that would allow for equal protection under section 1 of the
Amendment.68 It might be understandable that there may be confu-
sion regarding the scope of section 1 of the Amendment, especially
because the legislative activity can be interpreted in different ways.69
One persuasive piece of legislative history is Senator Charles
Sumner’s proposed version of the Thirteenth Amendment that was
rejected by the Senate Judiciary Committee.70 First, Senator Sumner’s
proposed version of the Amendment had a clause that would have
made freed slaves “equal before the law.”71 The Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee rejected that version for the current language of the Amend-
ment that is based on language used in the Northwest Ordinance.72
It is significant that Senator Trumbull, in preferring the current ver-
sion of the Amendment, which does not have an explicit equal protec-
tion clause, did attempt to assure Sumner that the final version of
the Amendment “[would] accomplish the [same] object.”73 Despite
the fact that there is some ambiguity on whether the current version
was intended to confer to freed African Americans equal treatment
under the law, it seems that Trumbull thought that the current
version conferred the same equality rights, as did other senators.74
However, some scholars have questioned whether the final
version of the Amendment did in fact include the same type of equal
protection that was included in Sumner’s version. First, they theo-
rized that the failure to use the same “equal before the law” lan-
guage in the final version meant that Trumbull and others did not
intend to include the same protection.75 However, instead of being
68. See Larry J. Pittman, Physician-Assisted Suicide in the Dark Ward: The Intersec-
tion of the Thirteenth Amendment and Health Care Treatments Having Disproportionate
Impacts on Disfavored Groups, 28 SETON HALL L. REV. 774, 859 (1998).
69. See MICHAEL VORENBERG, FINAL FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR, THE ABOLITION OF
SLAVERY, AND THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 53–60 (Christopher Tomlins ed., 2001).
70. Id. at 55.
71. Id. at 53.
72. Id. at 55.
73. Id. at 56.
74. Id. at 55. The principal senators who believed that the final version conferred the
same equality rights (civil rights) as Sumner’s version were Senator Trumbull and
Senator Howard. VORENBERG, supra note 69, at 55. Trumbull subsequently made the
same argument during the debate and enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Id. The
principal objector, who believed the final version did not confer equality rights, was
Senator Cowan—he apparently believed that the final version conferred only freedom
from physician bondage. Id. at 55–56.
75. See Herman N. Johnson, Jr., From Status to Agency: Abolishing the Very Spirit
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a rejection of Sumner’s efforts to include equal protection within the
scope of section 1, Trumbull and others, being mindful that many
senators hated Senator Summer, might have attempted to obtain
those senators’ votes by not including language from Sumner’s version
of the Amendment.76 Furthermore, Trumbull seemed to indicate to
Sumner during the debate of the Amendment that the final version
did include that same equal protection, albeit inferentially.77 And,
during the debate of the Civil Right Act of 1866, Trumbull and others
argued for a much broader interpretation of the Amendment that
would indicate that it offered much broader protection than mere
ending chattel slavery.78
Similarly, other senators and representatives during the debate
over the Amendment thought that the Amendment provided for
equal protection.79 Some understood that the Amendment would
“bring the Constitution into avowed harmony with the Declaration
of Independence.”80 Elijah Ward believed that the purpose of the
Amendment was “so that all persons shall be equal under the law,
without regard to color.”81 And, Godlove S. Orth of Indiana believed
that the Amendment represented the “self-evident truth, ‘that all
men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty and the
pursuit of happiness.’”82 Senator John Sherman of Ohio reasoned
“that the first clause of the Thirteenth Amendment ‘secures to every
man within the United States liberty in its broadest terms.’”83 Some
thought that the Amendment would be the final step.84 Additionally,
opponents believed that it would give certain rights including
“equality under the law; protection of life liberty, and property.”85
However, some scholars note the conflict in the different state-
ments of senators and congressmen during the debate and believe
of Slavery, 7 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 245, 257–59 (2017) (discussing some conflicting legis-
lative history statements during the debate of the Thirteenth Amendment).
76. VORENBERG, supra note 69, at 57–58.
77. Id. at 56.
78. See id. at 55.
79. Pittman, supra note 68, at 821–25.
80. Jacobus tenBroek, Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States:
Consummation to Abolition and Key to the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 CALIF. L. REV.
171, 179 (1951).
81. See id. at 175–76.
82. Id. at 178 (quoting Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 142–43 (1865) (statement
of Senator Godlove S. Orth)).
83. Pittman, supra note 68, at 827 n.215 (citing one commentator’s reference to
Senator Sherman’s statement) (emphasis added).
84. See G. Sidney Buchanan, The Quest for Freedom: A Legal History of the Thir-
teenth Amendment, 12 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 9 (1974).
85. Id.
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that it is not possible to determine whether equal protection was
intended to be within the coverage of the Amendment.86 They be-
lieved that different supporters and opponents of the Amendment
had different understandings about the scope of the Amendment
and that some of them were intentionally trying to keep its meaning
vague and uncertain to obtain either passage of the Amendment or
some other advantage.87
C. A Matter of Interpretation
If the Court were to assume that the Amendment’s legislative
history is indeterminate as to whether section 1 includes “badges and
incidents” of slavery, it could resolve that debate by resorting to a
structural argument based on the equality policy that underlies all
three of the Civil War Amendments.88 As far back as the Slaughter-
House Cases, some of the justices of the Court have believed that all
three of the Civil War Amendments have a singular purpose:
[A]nd on the most casual examination of the language of these
amendments, no one can fail to be impressed with the one per-
vading purpose found in them all, lying at the foundation of
each, and without which none of them would have been even
suggested; we mean the freedom of the slave race, the security
and firm establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the
newly-made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those who
had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him. It is true
that only the fifteenth amendment, in terms, mentions the negro
by speaking of his color and his slavery. But it is just as true
that each of the other articles was addressed to the grievances
of that race, and designed to remedy them as the fifteenth.89
This “protection of the newly-made freeman . . . from oppression”
implies equal protection from oppression, which can come through
both section 1 and section 2 of the Amendment.90 But, because there
was no guarantee that Congress will enact any future laws, the only
real way that the Amendment can definitively provide the equal
protection that Justice Miller articulated in the above-stated quote
is for section 1 of the Amendment itself to provide for that protection.
86. Johnson, supra note 75, at 259–60 (discussing some conflicting legislative history
statements from congressmen during the debate on the Thirteenth Amendment).
87. Id.
88. See text accompanying infra note 89.
89. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 71–72 (1873) (emphasis added).
90. See id.
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D. Two Ways to Incorporate Equal Protection into the Thirteenth
Amendment
1. Construing Ambiguity in Favor of an Equal Protection
Clause
If there is ambiguity in the meaning of section 1, the Court could
resort to canons of interpretation to resolve the issue. If the text of
the Amendment were a contract, the courts would normally construe
any ambiguity against the drafters of the Amendment, who were
Senator Trumbull and other sponsors.91 That might mean that
section 1 would not be interpreted to include badges and incidents.
However, sometimes the Court infuses public policy into its inter-
pretation and construes a text to further that policy. For example, the
Court, when interpreting section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act,92
has changed the normal rule of contract interpretation such that any
ambiguity in a contract for arbitration is construed in favor of arbi-
tration to further the alleged federal policy in favor of arbitration.93
If the Court were to take the same approach to interpreting
section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment—that it takes when inter-
preting the Federal Arbitration Act—it would construe any ambigu-
ity in the scope of section 1 in favor of the Amendment having an
equal protection clause or component, which would be an interpreta-
tion that would be broad enough to allow the eradication of many of
the badges and incidents of slavery and racial discrimination that
still exist in this country.94
91. See David Friedman, Note, Arbitration Revisited: Preemption of California’s
Unconscionability Doctrine After Concepcion, 11 DUKEJ.CONST.L.&PUB.POL’YSIDEBAR
21, 31 (2016) (“[T]he court construed ambiguities in contract interpretation in favor of
the non-drafting party.”).
92. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2. Section 2 of the Act provides that contracts
for arbitration are valid and enforceable. Id.
93. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1983)
(“The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning
the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.”). Elsewhere, this
author has argued that the Court has misinterpreted section 2 for its own purpose of
funneling cases to arbitration to reduce federal courts’ caseload. See Larry J. Pittman,
The Federal Arbitration Act: The Supreme Court’s Erroneous Statutory Interpretation,
Stare Decisis, and a Proposal for Change, 53 ALA. L. REV. 789, 830–54 (2002).
94. Essentially all of the federal anti-racial discrimination laws that Congress has
enacted establish a federal policy against racial discrimination. See infra note 169 and
accompanying text. And, the U.S. Supreme Court, in assessing a racial discrimination
allegation against an educational institution, acknowledged and applied the national
policy against racial discrimination, noting that it stems from case law and a variety of
federal anti-racial discrimination laws, including Title VI, the Voting Rights Act, and
several Presidential Executive Orders against racial discrimination in different contexts.
See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 592–96 (1982) (“An unbroken line
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2. Incorporating the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
Clause into the Thirteenth Amendment
There is another way for the Court to incorporate an equal pro-
tection clause into the Thirteenth Amendment. At least one scholar
has emphasized that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment has been used to influence the interpretation of other
constitutional amendments.95 This principle is shown by how the
Court has conflated the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment Equal Protection Clause and the Fifth Amendment Due Process
Cause to apply the same level of judicial scrutiny for both States’ and
the Federal Government’s use of racial classifications that either
disadvantage or seek to benignly help different racial groups.96
Initially, the Court had used the Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection Clause and strict scrutiny to regulate only acts of state-
sponsored discrimination challenged under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.97 However, in a long line of cases, amply discussed in Adarand
Constructors v. Pena,98 the Court concluded that it will apply strict
scrutiny to all racial classifications whether challenged under the
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause or under the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Cause.99 At first, the Court had applied a
lower level of scrutiny to challenges under the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause because that clause did not have an explicit equal
protection element.100 But, starting with Bolling v. Sharpe,101 and
of cases following Brown v. Board of Education establishes beyond doubt this Court’s
view that racial discrimination in education violates a most fundamental national public
policy, as well as rights of individuals.”).
95. See Jackson, supra note 64, at 1276.
96. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (“Accordingly,
we hold today that all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local
governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny. In
other words, such classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored
measures that further compelling governmental interests.”).
97. See id. at 222 (“With Croson, the Court finally agreed that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment requires strict scrutiny of all race-based action by state and local governments.”).
98. See id. at 227.
99. See id.
100. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). Although the Court’s opinions are
not entirely clear, the Court seemed to resolve racial discrimination claims under the
Fifth Amendment by using an arbitrary standard to find that racial classifications were
arbitrary and a violation of the Due Process Clause if they were not sufficiently justified.
See id. at 499.
101. Id. at 500 (“[A]nd thus it imposes on Negro children of the District of Columbia
a burden that constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of their liberty in violation of the Due
Process Clause.”). But, the Bolling Court then concluded that, “[i]n view of [the] decision
that the Constitution prohibits the states from maintaining racially segregated public
schools, it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty
on the Federal Government.” Id.
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including Korematsu v. United States,102 McLaughlin v. Florida,103
Loving v. Virginia,104 Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,105 and finally ending
with Adarand, the Court established that it would use the same equal
protection analysis to resolve racial classification challenges against
the Federal Government as it uses to resolve challenges against States
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.106
It is reasonably clear that the Court thought that the equal protection
policy and strict scrutiny should be applied to all racial classifications.
And because that notion of equal protection stems from the Four-
teenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause, it is clear that the equal
protection policy has become a structural instrument that influ-
enced the Court’s interpretation of at least one other constitutional
amendment—the Fifth Amendment and its Due Process Clause.
If the structural powers of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause can influence the Court’s interpretation of the Fifth
Amendment, which does not even have an equal protection clause,
then there is no good reason why that same equal protection policy
should not be applied to other Amendments, including the Thir-
teenth Amendment. The type of holistic or structural argument that
this Article is making is not outside of the mainstream of constitu-
tional interpretation. Other legal scholars have written on the use
of holistic and structural arguments.107 One scholar referenced Printz
v. United States108 and Alden v. Maine109 as two examples when al-
leged originalist or textualist Supreme Court justices have resorted
to structural arguments to support desired outcomes.110 In Printz—
in a majority opinion by Justice Scalia (who held himself out as
committed only to the text of the Constitution for constitutional
interpretation)—the Court held that the Brady Handgun Violence
Prevention Act’s provision—that required local law enforcement of-
ficials to conduct background checks—was unconstitutional because
it imposed an obligation on state officials to enforce federal laws.111
The Court did not rely on any specific provision of the Constitution;
instead it referenced several provisions of the Constitution where
102. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 234–35 (1944).
103. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 190–92 (1964).
104. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967).
105. See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975).
106. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
107. See Thomas B. Colby, Originalism and Structural Argument, 113 NW. U.L. REV.
1297, 1310–17 (2019).
108. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997).
109. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 730 (1999).
110. Colby, supra note 107, at 1299.
111. Printz, 521 U.S. at 933.
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the States were recognized as having a separate existence from the
federal government.112 The Court also relied on legal sources, not con-
tained in the text of the Constitution, such as the Framers’ intent
as stated in the Federalist Papers: “The Framers’ experience under
the Articles of Confederation had persuaded them that using the
States as the instruments of federal governance was both ineffectual
and provocative of federal-state conflict.”113 The Court reasoned that
the background check requirement would interfere with the separa-
tion of powers between the states and the federal government.114
And, that it would also interfere with the separation of powers
between the different branches of the federal government.115
In Alden, the Court held that aggrieved employees could not
bring a state court action for overtime pay against their state em-
ployer without the state’s consent to be sued.116 The Court reasoned
that the state had governmental immunity against such suits, not
pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment, but because of the state’s
position as a sovereign entity in the federalism system that the U.S.
Constitution created.117 The implication is that for a state to be
deemed a sovereign entity is its concomitant right to assert sover-
eign immunity against lawsuits.118 Instead of relying on a particular
amendment in the Constitution, the Court did an analysis of the
112. Id. at 918–19. The Court stated:
It is incontestable that the Constitution established a system of “dual
sovereignty.” . . . Although the States surrendered many of their powers to
the new Federal Government, they retained “a residuary and inviolable
sovereignty[.]” . . . This is reflected throughout the Constitution’s text, . . .
including (to mention only a few examples) the prohibition on any involun-
tary reduction or combination of a State’s territory, Art. IV, § 3; the Judicial
Power Clause, Art. III, § 2, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause, Art.
IV, § 2, which speak of the “Citizens” of the States; the amendment pro-
vision, Article V, which requires the votes of three-fourths of the States to
amend the Constitution; and the Guarantee Clause, Art. IV, § 4, which
“presupposes the continued existence of the states and . . . those means and
instrumentalities which are the creation of their sovereign and reserved
rights[.]” . . . Residual state sovereignty was also implicit, of course, in the
Constitution’s conferral upon Congress of not all governmental powers, but
only discrete, enumerated ones, Art. I, § 8, which implication was rendered
express by the Tenth Amendment’s assertion that “[t]he powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”
Id. (citations omitted).
113. Id. at 919.
114. See id. at 898, 919–21.
115. Id. at 922.
116. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999).
117. Id. at 713.
118. See id.
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historical understanding of what it meant to be sovereign at the
time of the adoption of the Constitution.119
The relevancy of Alden and Printz to the holistic or structural
argument, on which much of this Article is based, is that, as the
Court used a structural argument to resolve the sovereign immunity
issues in those cases, it should use a holistic or structural approach
to interpret the Thirteenth Amendment, by giving it an interpreta-
tion that would further the beneficial purpose of helping newly freed
African Americans and their descendants to ensure that they have
equal protection of the laws. This equal protection purpose comes
from the structure of all three of the Civil War Amendments, which
Justice Miller in the Slaughter-House Cases acknowledged as hav-
ing a singular purpose, and from certain portions of the Thirteenth
Amendment’s legislative history.120
The Court’s acknowledgment that the Thirteenth Amendment
has its own equal protection clause, or that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment Equal Protection Clause influences the resolution of racial
classification challenges under the Thirteenth Amendment, would
free up the Thirteenth Amendment to address acts of private racial
discrimination that are not actionable under either the Fourteenth
Amendment or Fifth Amendment. Then, courts will have more
freedom to apply the Thirteenth Amendment and develop standards
to control its application to racial discrimination.
E. No Interpretation that Causes a Constitutional Violation
The failure of courts to develop standards regarding the scope
of section 1 is problematic because it leaves a gap where more un-
equal protection will exist. Normally, with statutory interpretation
and constitutional interpretation, the Court tries to avoid interpre-
tations that cause violations of the Constitution.121 In the Thirteenth
Amendment context, the Court is in danger of creating a situation
that is similar to a violation of the Constitution if it continues to
defer too much to Congress’s section 2 powers instead of giving more
attention to developing case law that does a better job at defining
119. Id. at 713–14.
120. See text accompanying supra notes 70–83, 89.
121. Russell L. Weaver, Some Realism About Chevron, 58 MO. L. REV. 129, 162 n.223
(1993) (“Where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious
constitutional problems, a court should construe the statute to avoid such problems unless
such intention is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.”) (citing DeBartolo Corp. v.
Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)).
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the scope of section 1 of the Amendment. In Palmer v. Thompson,122
the Court, in rejecting a Thirteenth Amendment challenge to a ra-
cially discriminatory closing of Jackson, Mississippi’s public swim-
ming pools, referenced Congress’s section 2 powers and asserted:
“But Congress has passed no law under this power to regulate a
city’s opening or closing of swimming pools or other recreational
facilities.”123 In Memphis v. Green,124 the Court stated:
“By its own unaided force and effect,” the Thirteenth Amendment
“abolished slavery” and “established universal freedom.” . . .
Whether or not the Amendment itself did any more than that—a
question not involved in this case—it is at least clear that the
Enabling Clause of that Amendment empowered Congress to do
much more.125
The problem with the Court’s relying too heavily on Congress’s
section 2 powers is that it continues a system of second-class citizen-
ship for anyone except white men. For their power, wealth, social,
political and economic rights, white men do not have to wait for a con-
gressional enactment to obtain any protection they desire. Such pro-
tections either predate the Constitution—as natural law and natural
rights—or they come from the specific provisions of the Constitution
and its amendments. For example, to obtain protection against alleged
reverse discrimination or minority set asides, white men do not have
to wait for Congress to enact any laws to protect them. Rather, the
Court has provided such protection through strict scrutiny as it did
in Adarand, where the Court, on its own volition, decided to apply
strict scrutiny to a benign racial classification, even when it had
previously applied a lower level of scrutiny and made a distinction
between racial discrimination claims against states under the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause and such claims
against the federal government under the Due Process Clause.126
When African Americans and other minorities—who fall within
the Thirteenth Amendment’s equal protection/anti-racial discrimi-
nation policy—have to depend on Congress to protect them through
legislation under section 2 of the Amendment, or under the Com-
merce Clause for Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (or under
some other congressional authority), such a system of protection
122. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 226–27 (1971).
123. Id. at 227.
124. Memphis v. Green, 451 U.S. 100, 125 (1981).
125. Id.
126. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
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creates an unequal protection problem—with white men receiving
protection directly under constitutional amendments while African
Americans, other minorities, and even white women, having to
receive protection from a congressional enactment. The problem
with this unequal treatment is that it leaves the protection of minori-
ties’ rights to a Congress that is frequently dysfunctional and whose
beneficence in favor of minorities depends on which political party
has a majority of the U.S. House and Senate. Under such a system
of protection, at best the protection of minorities will be cyclical; at
worst it will continue to be inadequate and only marginally provide
the type of protection and benign action that would be needed to
eradicate racism and improve the lives of a large part of the African-
American and other minority population.127
Therefore, to avoid an unequal protection situation, the Court
should reconsider its Thirteenth Amendment jurisprudence and be
willing to invigorate the amendment so that it will provide African
Americans and other minorities the same type of constitutional pro-
tection that the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fifth Amendment,
through the Court’s use of strict scrutiny, provide for white men.
Furthermore, not only would a development of the law under
the Thirteenth Amendment create a system whereby protection under
the Thirteenth Amendment would be more in line with equal protec-
tion under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fifth Amendment,
but a claim under the Thirteenth Amendment would then reach more
acts of racial discrimination because it would cover private discrimi-
nation and can arguably be construed to cover discrimination or
unequal treatment that has a racially discriminatory impact, instead
of having to be confined to acts of intentional racial discrimination
that the Court has established for claims under the Fourteenth and
Fifth Amendments.128
In sum, as long as the Court continues to defer to Congress’s
section 2 powers, instead of developing and interpreting section 1 of
the Thirteenth Amendment to its fullest extent, there will be an
unequal treatment of African Americans and other minorities in
this country. The Thirteenth Amendment is broad enough for the
127. See Ezra Klein, Congressional Dysfunction, VOX (May 15, 2015), https://www.vox
.com/2015/1/2/18089154/congressional-dysfunction; Andrew Taylor, Once Again, Congress
Unable to Act During National Trauma, AP NEWS (June 27, 2020), https://apnews.com
/58cbed932fd14eb0bfb2ac54320bd649 [https://perma.cc/YJE3-UGPZ]; Sarah Binder,
Congress Can’t Easily Pass Police Reforms. Here’s Why, WASH.POST (June 5, 2020), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/06/05/congress-cant-easily-pass-police-reforms
-heres-why [http://perma.cc/4MU6-PPND].
128. See text accompanying infra note 130.
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Court to establish that it contains an equal protection component or
that structurally the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause should be incorporated into the Thirteenth Amendment.
F. The Standards for Interpretation of an Equal Protection
Challenge Under the Thirteenth Amendment
If an equal protection clause or component is within the scope
of section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment, the standard of judicial
review should be unique to the Thirteenth Amendment in several
respects. First, intentional discrimination should not be required, as
is the case when one brings an Equal Protection Claim under the
Fourteenth Amendment.129 Elsewhere, this writer has argued that
one should be able to bring a disproportionate impact claim under
the Thirteenth Amendment.130 Now, this Article further asserts
that, in addition to its own equal protection clause or component,
the Thirteenth Amendment arose out of a policy of beneficence,131 in
129. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976).
130. See Pittman, supra note 68, at 885–86. The problem with current laws that pro-
vide a remedy for racial discrimination is that they tend to require that the aggrieved
party, normally an African American or other minority, to show that the targeted defen-
dant was acting with the intent to discriminate. Id.; Davis, 426 U.S. at 240 (explaining
claims under the Equal Protection Clause require a showing of discriminatory intent).
In Croker v. Boeing Co., 662 F.2d 975, 988–89 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated, 468 U.S. 1201
(1984), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals stated:
Furthermore, we believe that policy considerations support this conclusion.
In rejecting a discriminatory impact standard for fourteenth amendment
claims, the Supreme Court noted that such a standard might “invalidate a
whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing
statutes that may be more burdensome to the poor and to the average black
than to the more affluent white.” Applying an impact standard to section
1981 raises similar concerns. In significant measure, an impact standard
would have the very consequences that the Supreme Court sought to avoid
in Washington v. Davis. In fact, because section 1981, unlike the fourteenth
amendment, covers not only governmental but also private conduct, an
impact standard applied to section 1981 could be more intrusive than would
one applied to the fourteenth amendment. We do not address whether
Congress could pass legislation under the thirteenth amendment requiring
proof of impact only. Without, however, a clear indication that Congress in-
tended section 1981 to reach nonpurposeful [sic] conduct or neutral regula-
tions having a disproportionate impact, we are reluctant to ignore the
concerns voiced in Washington v. Davis.
Id. It seems ironic that courts would be more concerned about not invalidating a host of
“tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes” than protecting people who
may have a lower economic standing than some white Americans who have prospered
because they have not been subject to a generation of discrimination. Id. at 988.
131. See The Principle of Beneficence in Applied Ethics, STAN.ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL.
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that it was an affirmative effort to help African-American slaves by
freeing them from the bonds of slavery and the “badges and incidents”
of slavery, as some argue.132 Furthermore, the civil rights laws that
Congress enacted under its section 2 authority, including the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, were in furtherance of this beneficent effort to
rid freed slaves, and their descendants, of continuing discrimination
that many in the South, and elsewhere, used to continue as many
of the disabilities of slavery as they could.133
The joint policy of equal protection and beneficence would sup-
port the use of different standards of review depending on whether
a racial classification is for racial animus purposes; for benign pur-
poses of remedying past discrimination; or for purposes of ensuring
that slavery and other forms of hostile racial discrimination are not
reinstated. If the classification is one that imposes hardship on African
Americans and other minorities through either having a dispro-
portionate impact, or if it was imposed out of racial animus, the one
who imposed the classification should have to satisfy the strict
scrutiny test that the classification serves a compelling state or
private interest that cannot be satisfied with less restrictive alterna-
tives.134 However, if the classification is for a benign purpose, then
the aggrieved person should be required to show that racial animus
was the sole motivation for the classification.
Therefore, Adarand cries out for reinterpretation because the
Court applied an Equal Protection analysis under the Fifth Amend-
ment (using the strict scrutiny standard of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).135 The Thirteenth Amend-
ment and its policies were not applied to the challenged minority
set-aside. If the Thirteenth Amendment had been applied, the Court
could have used the Amendment’s equal protection/anti-racial dis-
crimination and beneficence policies. Unless the aggrieved white
subcontractors showed that the set-asides were motivated by the
government’s racial animus against them, they should have lost
their challenge as long as the purpose of the set-aside was rationally
related to the federal government’s furthering of a policy of helping
the minority contractors bridge the wealth gap between white Ameri-
cans and African Americans.136
(Feb. 11, 2019), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/principle-beneficence [http://perma.cc
/YV7W-7WKD].
132. See Pittman, supra note 68, at 821–23.
133. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 70–72 (1873).
134. See Pittman, supra note 68, at 879.
135. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
136. See id. at 247–48 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Brent E. Simmons, Reconsidering
Strict Scrutiny of Affirmative Action, 2 MICH. J. RACE & L. 51, 77–79 (1996).
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Furthermore, unlike in Adarand, in which there was a dispute
over whether the presumption of disadvantage that the government
gave to some of the minority contractors was supported by the fact of
their actually being disadvantaged,137 a similar presumption that is
given pursuant to Congress’s section 2 authority should be allowed
if it is rationally related to alleviating the systemic society-wide
wealth gap between African Americans and white Americans, even
if the disparity in a certain industry—where the set-aside or other
program is applied—does not show a similar disparity or history of
racial discrimination. For example, it is conceivable that Congress
could develop an economic development plan that would be national
in scope, in that it would have set aside strategies that would be ap-
plicable to many industries as a national strategy, although a racial
or wealth disparity could not be historically or presently shown in
some of the affected industries.138 In such situations, the courts should
defer to Congress’s judgment in determining which policies and pro-
grams are needed to eradicate the present racial and wealth dispari-
ties that are “badges and incidents” of slavery. Any person wanting to
challenge such programs would have to, pursuant to the approach
taken in this Article, show that the relevant plans or programs were
motivated solely by racial animus against the person. The difference
between this approach and the approach in Adarand is that, instead
of placing the burden of justifying an asserted benign racial classifica-
tion on the beneficiaries of the classifications,139 the burden would be
placed on the alleged aggrieved parties. Given the Thirteenth Amend-
ment’s beneficence policy—as an amendment that was designed to
primarily benefit African Americans, as were all of the Civil War
Amendments—it would only be appropriate to have a more relaxed
standard of review than strict scrutiny, to resolve challenges to ra-
cial classifications that fall within the scope of the Amendment.
This Article also asserts that the Thirteenth Amendment should
not only be used as a means by which an aggrieved person can file
a claim, but that it should also be used as an affirmative defense,
137. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 238–39.
138. See Emily Cochran & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, $2 Trillion Coronavirus Stimulus Bill
Is Signed into Law, N.Y. TIMES (March 27, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/27/us
/politics/coronavirus-house-voting.html [https://perma.cc/AX63-LDH8]. As an example of
a national program that may award benefits to some who do not need the benefits, to
achieve a broader societal objective, one can look no further than the Coronavirus stimulus
checks that were designed to boost the economy despite that many wealthy people re-
ceived the checks even though they would end up saving the money instead of spending it
to support the economy which was the purpose for which the national government gave
the checks.
139. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227–29.
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whereby those who benefit from a racial classification, like the mi-
nority contractors in Adarand, can use the Amendment as an affir-
mative defense to support any programs or other initiatives, such as
those at issue in Adarand.140
One can anticipate that there will be resistance if the Court
changes its use of the strict scrutiny standard. However, there are
several observations that are important to its doing so. First, there
is nothing inherently special about the strict scrutiny standard.
Some scholars have traced this standard back to certain statements
that the Court made in Korematsu v. United States,141 where the
Court stated:
It should be noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions which
curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately
suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconsti-
tutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most
rigid scrutiny. Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify
the existence of such restrictions; racial antagonism never can.142
But, when one looks at the end result of the Court’s holding—that
Americans of Asian descent could be confined to camps—one is left
with the belief that there is nothing inherently protective about the
strict scrutiny standard.143 Rather, its protection depends on who is
defining the phrase “public necessity,”144 and which justices make
up the Supreme Court.
Furthermore, when one considers the reason why the Court
continues to use the strict scrutiny standard when evaluating racial
classifications, he or she might conclude that the standard stands
on shaky ground, at least when applied to benign racial classifica-
tions. The reason for its continued use, as articulated by Justice
O’Connor in Richmond v. Croson,145 appears to be to “smoke out” the
140. See id. at 204–05; Alexander Tsesis, Confederate Monuments As Badges of Slavery,
108 KY. L.J. 695, 712 (2020) (discussing the use of the Thirteenth Amendment as an
affirmative defense and asserting that, “Cities seeking to remove confederate symbols
can look to the Thirteenth Amendment as a source of affirmative defense against States
seeking to bar their removal”).
141. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
142. Id.
143. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 236 (citing Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223).
144. See David Orentlicher, Politics and the Supreme Court: The Need for Ideological
Balance, 79 U. PITT. L. REV. 411, 413 (2018); see also Supreme Court Justices Become Less
Impartial and More Ideological When Casting the Swing Vote, KELLOGGINSIGHT (Sept. 13,
2018), https://insight.kellogg.northwestern.edu/article/supreme-court-justices -become-less
-impartial-and-more-ideological-when-casting-the-swing-vote [http://perma.cc/4PPR-7UYT].
145. Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).
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use of “illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype[s].”146 That reason
is premised on several propositions:
1. Application of strict scrutiny used for the purpose of
assuring that the “remedial goal” is “important enough
to warrant” the use of race, which the court believe is
a “suspect tool”;
2. That the means chosen “fit” this “compelling goal so
closely that there is little or no possibility that the mo-
tive for the classification was illegitimate racial preju-
dice or stereotype.”147
First, as far as this writer can tell, none of these policy ratio-
nales come from either the language or the legislative history of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. At best, they
stem from the Court’s efforts to find reasons to support its decision to
use strict scrutiny. Second, there is nothing in either the language
or the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment that man-
dates that racial classification (or race) can only be used for reme-
dial purposes. Third, the narrowly tailored fit rule—to the extent
146. In Croson, Justice O’Connor stated:
1. Since the Plan denies certain citizens the opportunity to compete for
a fixed percentage of public contracts based solely on their race, Wygant’s
strict scrutiny standard of review must be applied, which requires a firm
evidentiary basis for concluding that the underrepresentation of minorities
is a product of past discrimination. Application of that standard, which is
not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited by the racial
classification, assures that the city is pursuing a remedial goal important
enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool and that the means chosen
“fit” this compelling goal so closely that there is little or no possibility that
the motive for the classification was illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype.
The relaxed standard of review proposed by Justice MARSHALL’s dissent
does not provide a means for determining that a racial classification is in
fact “designed to further remedial goals,” since it accepts the remedial nature
of the classification before examination of the factual basis for the classifica-
tion’s enactment and the nexus between its scope and that factual basis.
Even if the level of equal protection scrutiny could be said to vary according
to the ability of different groups to defend their interests in the representative
process, heightened scrutiny would still be appropriate in the circumstances
of this case, since blacks constitute approximately 50% of the city’s popula-
tion and hold five of nine seats on the City Council, thereby raising the con-
cern that the political majority may have acted to disadvantage a minority
based on unwarranted assumptions or incomplete facts.
Id. at 472–73.
Given the 50% African American population in Richmond, perhaps the Court may
have had reasons for suspicion of the set-aside in Croson, but such suspicion will not
exist in every situation, and therefore, there is no real reason for applying strict scrutiny
to all benign racial classifications.
147. See id. at 472, 493.
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that its real purpose is to ensure, to the extent possible, that the real
motivation for the classification is not “illegitimate racial prejudice or
stereotype”—is not the only way to achieve that purpose148 as courts
can develop other evidentiary methods and hearings to determine
when a racial classification is benign or based on racial animus.
For example, the test that this Article offers is that, when a
proponent of a benign racial classification offers a rational purpose,
including a benign purpose that is either remedial or for the purpose
of eradicating “badges and incidents” of slavery (even when the
particular industry has not had a history of intentional racial dis-
crimination), the Court could apply either a preponderance of the
evidence standard or a clear and convincing evidence standard
(whichever burden the Court decides best serves the purpose of the
Thirteenth Amendment) to determine whether the classification is
rationally related to a remedial purpose or to a benign purpose of
eradicating badges and incidents of slavery.149 Then, the burden
would shift to the aggrieved person to show, by the same burden of
proof, that the proponents of the racial classifications were moti-
vated solely by racial animus. And, the courts should require credi-
ble proof of animus instead of speculation or mere unsupported
allegations. This method of proof would give meaning to the equal
protection and beneficence policies that underlie the Thirteenth
Amendment and would at the same time be consistent with the
Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition against racial classification
based on animus and a purpose to harm because of racial hatred or
notions of racial inferiority.
Although no court has presently shifted the burden to the
challenger of a congressional enactment under Congress’s section 2
authority, some lower courts have given a broad interpretation to
that section 2 authority. These courts will uphold the constitutional-
ity of a Congressional enactment if it meets the “rational determina-
tion test” of Jones v. Mayer.150 For example, in United States v.
Hatch,151 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Matthew
148. Id. at 493. Instead of trying to ferret out secreted racial animus, it would appear
that the real reason for the fit test is to minimize the harmful effects that a racial
classification would have on the aggrieved person, which, in the case of benign minority
set-asides or preferences, would normally be a white person—as were the challengers
in Croson and Adarand. Id. at 472–73; Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,
238–39 (1995).
149. This approach is broader than Justice Bradley’s statement in the Civil Rights
Cases, which indicates legislation or other action must be “corrective.” The Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13–14 (1883).
150. See Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409, 410, 440 (1968).
151. United States v. Hatch, 722 F.3d 1193, 1195 (10th Cir. 2013).
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Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Act152 was constitutional
under Congress’s section 2 authority because, in enacting the Act,
Congress had rationally determined that violence based on race,
color, religion, or national origin (as the Act prohibited) was a badge
and incident of slavery; and therefore, that Act was properly within
the scope of Congress’s section 2 authority.153 The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals, in United States v. Cannon,154 likewise held that the
Hate Crime Act was a constitutional exercise of Congress’s section
2 authority under the Thirteenth Amendment.155
In reaching its decision, the Hatch court realized that it was
approving a broad application of Congress’s section 2 authority,156
but noted that Congress, in enacting the Hate Crime Act, has lim-
ited some of its application to certain conditions that existed in the
1860s.157 The Hatch court stated:
At its core, Hatch’s argument raises important concerns we share.
“Badges and incidents of slavery,” taken at face value, puts em-
phasis solely on the conduct Congress seeks to prohibit, and it
seems to place few limits on what that conduct might be. Given
152. The portion of the Act at issue in Hatch was:
(1) Offenses involving actual or perceived race, color, religion, or national
origin.—Whoever, whether or not acting under color of law, willfully causes
bodily injury to any person or, through the use of fire, a firearm, a dangerous
weapon, or an explosive or incendiary device, attempts to cause bodily in-
jury to any person, because of the actual or perceived race, color, religion,
or national origin of any person—
(A) shall be imprisoned not more than 10 years, fined in accordance with
this title, or both. . . .
Id. at 1195, 1200 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(1)).
153. In enacting the Hate Crime Act, Congress relied on the following finding:
For generations, the institutions of slavery and involuntary servitude were
defined by the race, color, and ancestry of those held in bondage. Slavery
and involuntary servitude were enforced, both prior to and after the
adoption of the 13th amendment to the Constitution of the United States,
through widespread public and private violence directed at persons because
of their race, color, or ancestry, or perceived race, color, or ancestry. Ac-
cordingly, eliminating racially motivated violence is an important means of
eliminating, to the extent possible, the badges, incidents, and relics of slavery
and involuntary servitude.
Id. at 1195, 1200–01.
154. United States v. Cannon, 750 F.3d 492, 494 (5th Cir. 2014).
155. Id. at 502.
In conclusion, racially motivated violence was essential to the enslavement
of African-Americans and was widely employed after the Civil War in an
attempt to return African-Americans to a position of de facto enslavement.
In light of these facts, we cannot say that Congress was irrational in de-
termining that racially motivated violence is a badge or incident of slavery.
Id.
156. Hatch, 722 F.3d at 1204.
157. Id. at 1205.
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slaves’ intensely deplorable treatment and slavery’s lasting effects,
nearly every hurtful thing one human could do to another and
nearly every disadvantaged state of being might be analogized
to slavery—and thereby labeled a badge or incident of slavery
under Jones’s rational determination test. In effect, this inter-
pretation gives Congress the power to define the meaning of the
Constitution—a rare power indeed. And many legal scholars
have encouraged broad use of Section 2 power in essentially this
way, which would arguably raise the sort of federalism concerns
articulated in City of Boerne, Lopez, and Morrison. Others have
argued for a narrower interpretation that relates more directly
to slavery as an institution rather than to any individual feature
of slavery.158
G. Congress’s Inaction Warrants an Expanded Use of Section 1 of
the Amendment
An expanded use of section 1 of the Amendment is needed
because Congress has not used its section 2 authority as expansively
and proactively as it should. Despite Congress’s initial enactment
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and several other Reconstruction Era
statutes, the racial hostility and discriminatory practices against
African Americans continued—in a virtually legal manner—after
slavery ended in 1865 until Congress decided to take some action in
1964 with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting
Rights Act of 1965.159 That the political and economic onslaughts
against African Americans had been persistent is shown by the fact
that the Civil Rights Act and Voting Rights Act were still needed in
1964 and 1965, despite Congress having ratified the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments about one hundred years
before then. So the harrowing conclusion is that African Americans
in this country have really been free in their political, civil, and eco-
nomic rights for only approximately fifty-five years. Thus, one should
not be surprised by the large gap in wealth between African Ameri-
cans and white Americans.
Admittedly, a substantial number of African Americans, based
on their percentage of the American population, have moved above
the poverty level, primarily fueled by the enactment of social secu-
rity.160 But, the poverty rate of African Americans is still more than
158. Id. at 1204.
159. For a discussion of the persistent violence that private persons and state officials
used in the South to deny the newly freed African Americans their social, political, and
economic rights, see Bennett, supra note 20, at 439–41.
160. See Kathleen Romig, Social Security: A Vital Protection for African American
People of All Ages, CTR. ON BUDGET&POL’YPRIORITIES (July 2019), https://www.cbpp.org
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twice that of white Americans.161 The median African-American
family’s household wealth is only 10.2 percent of the median white
family’s wealth (about $17,409 versus $171,000), which some com-
mentators attribute in part to the systemic racial discrimination in
home ownership that was caused by racially discriminatory housing
policies, including policies that stem from the federal government.162
It should be noted that redlining as a housing policy of the federal
government—where African Americans were not given loans to build
or buy homes in white suburban areas—did not end until Congress
enacted the Fair Housing Act in 1968.163
What this means is that—while on the one hand Congress
enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the statute that created the sec-
tion 1983 cause of action, and several Reconstruction Era laws that
proscribe violence and conspiracy against African Americans164—
Congress, on the other hand, did not take any legislative action
against harmful employment discrimination, voting rights discrimi-
nation, public accommodations discrimination, or systemic redlining
discrimination until the 1960s, despite that some of these forms of
discrimination are the current reasons for the substantial wealth
gap between white Americans and African Americans. This means
that generations after generations of African Americans and their
descendants have been financially disadvantaged by Congress’s in-
attention to systemic economics, social and political discrimination
against African Americans.165
What this also means is that Congress—in knowingly failing to
use its section 2 authority—has been willing to let African Ameri-
cans and other minorities suffer for a long time.166 For example,
/blog/social-security-a-vital-protection-for-african-american-people-of-all-ages
[http://perma.cc/5DBW-26SH].
161. Elise Gould & Jessica Schieder, Poverty Persists 50 Years After the Poor People’s
Campaign, ECON. POL’Y INST. (May 17, 2018), https://www.epi.org/publication/poverty
-persists-50-years-after-the-poor-peoples-campaign-black-poverty-rates-are-more-than
-twice-as-high-as-white-poverty-rates [http://perma.cc/X2BW-3MQR].
162. Janelle Jones, John Schmitt & Valerie Wilson, 50 Years After the Kerner
Commission, ECON.POL’YINST. (Feb. 26, 2018), https://www.epi.org/publication/50-years
-after-the-kerner-commission [http://perma.cc/5HB5-DGVQ].
163. Terry Gross, A ‘Forgotten History’ of How the U.S. Government Segregated
America, NPR (May 3, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/05/03/526655831/a-forgotten-his
tory-of-how-the-u-s-government-segregated-america [http://perma.cc/948T-N9SH].
164. See infra note 169.
165. Joni Hersch & Jennifer Bennett Shinall, Fifty Years Later: The Legacy of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 43 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 424, 428–29, 441 (2015).
166. The last statute that Congress enacted under its section 2 powers occurred in
2009 during President Barack Obama’s Administration when Democrats were in charge
of both houses of Congress. It took about eight years to enact the law, with the Bill
having to be reintroduced in Congress from 2000 to 2009. See Elliot C. McLaughlin,
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during the debate of the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Act,
Attorney General Eric Holder testified in support of the law; and, he
recalled that during 1998 he had testified in favor of an earlier
version of the bill and that in the interim, from then to 2009, when
Congress finally enacted the bill into law, about 77,000 hate crimes
had occurred in America.167
This willingness to accept others’ suffering from racial discrimi-
nation is going to continue in the future as the U.S. House and
Senate are divided by the two political parties competing for major-
ity party status; they are deadlocked because one party is hesitant
to vote for the proposed laws that another party offers out of fear
that it will lose an advantage in the next election, and because there
is a new resurgence of racism and nationalism where the American
public may be becoming more tribal and, therefore, Congress may
not be inclined to, or may not be politically able to, exercise its section
2 powers to eradicate existing “badges and incidents” of slavery. For
example, Congress has not tried to use its section 2 authority since
the 2009 enactment of the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr.
law—which took more than ten years to enact—when the first
African-American president, Barack Obama, was in office.168
The position of this Article is not that Congress has not had
some success in using its section 2 authority to enact laws that have
helped African Americans and other minorities.169 However, all of
There are Two Names on the Federal Hate Crimes Law. One is Matthew Shepard. The
Other Is James Byrd, Jr., CNN (Apr. 25, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/24/us/james
-byrd-hate-crime-legislation-john-king-execution/index.html [http://perma.cc/UD7Z-E9U4].
167. Holder Pushes for Hate-Crimes Law; GOP Unpersuaded, CNN POLITICS (June 25,
2009), https://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/06/25/holder.hate.crimes [http://perma.cc
/3MZZ-HK8W] (“Specifically, he said, more than 77,000 hate crime incidents were re-
ported by the FBI between 1998 and 2007, or ‘nearly one hate crime for every hour of
every day over the span of a decade.’”).
168. See McLaughlin, supra note 166.
169. One scholar notes that more recently, instead of relying on its Thirteenth Amend-
ment section 2 authority, Congress has chosen to rely on the Commerce Clause and on
the Fourteenth Amendment for the authority to enact civil rights legislation. See
Alexander Tsesis, Interpreting the Thirteenth Amendment, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1337,
1338 (2009). This author is not aware of any current scholarship that quantifies the
success that the various civil rights statutes, which Congress enacted under section 2 of
the Thirteenth Amendment, have had. Undoubtedly, many African Americans and other
minorities have benefited from section 1981 and section 1982, as well as from Title VII,
Title VI, and other federal civil rights laws enacted under both section 2 of Congress’s
authority and under the Commerce Clause, including the Civil Rights Act of 1964. As a
matter of fact, the current middle class of African Americans may owe their success to
the freedom of opportunities that these laws provided for them. However, there is much
more work to be done. There is at least one estimate that it will take about 228 years for
the wealth of Black families to equal the wealth of white families today. Aimee Picchi,
How Long Will it Take Black Families to Catch Up with White Wealth, CBS NEWS (Aug. 9,
2016), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/heres-how-long-it-will-take-black-families-to-catch
-up-with-whites [http://perma.cc/8M7Y-AD7Q].
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these federal civil rights laws are “corrective” in that they provide
either a private civil claim or a criminal remedy for acts of racial
discrimination that have already occurred.170 But for many African
Americans, these laws have done little to proactively remedy the
harmful economic effects of slavery and of hundreds of years of ra-
cial discrimination.171 In other words, Congress has not proactively
passed legislation to eradicate the remaining economic disparity be-
tween African Americans and white Americans. This type of legisla-
tion would involve creating systems and programs that would reduce
the remaining systemic racism and discrimination that currently
exist in this country, and it would also create the type of educational
and economic development that would help African Americans be
better able to use the so-called “equal playing field” that really does
not exist in this country.172 Some of this work would probably re-
quire studies, commissions, and experts to identify areas that need
special legislation; to identify the types of programs and initiatives
that would, once and for all, remedy the harmful effects of past acts
of slavery and racial discrimination, and current “badges and inci-
dents” of slavery; and to create a system of equality that would, at
some point in the future, produce an environment where all races of
people in America will really have an equal protection of laws and
opportunities. Congress has the resources and can obtain the exper-
tise to do the job, but it currently lacks the will to do so.
In the meantime, Congress’s failure to deal with the historical
personal and economic effects from centuries of racial discrimina-
tion allows the substantial advantages that white Americans have
over African Americans to continue. It maintains the unequal eco-
nomic and social positions of African Americans and other minori-
ties when compared to white Americans. And therefore, Congress is
at least complicit in the unequal protection of African Americans
and the racial discrimination that some of them suffer.173
170. Some of the statutes that Congress has enacted are: 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Equal
Rights Under the Law); 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (Property Rights of Citizens); 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights); 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (Conspiracies to Interfere with
Civil Rights); 18 U.S.C. § 242 (Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law); 18 U.S.C.
§ 241 (Conspiracy Against Rights); and 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (Peonage Abolished).
171. See Bennett, supra note 20, at 441, 490 (discussing how violence has been used
to prevent gains by African Americans).
172. See Jones et al., supra note 162.
173. For an argument that the lack of police investigation into rape can be an equal
protection violation of rape victim’s rights, see Deborah Tuerkheimer, Underenforcement
as Unequal Protection, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1287, 1287 (2016) (“When the Equal Protection
Clause was conceived, the [F]ramers were chiefly concerned with the states’ failure to
provide black citizens with protection from private violence. After passage of the Four-
teenth Amendment, the ‘protection model’ of equal protection, along with the federal
power to enforce it, lay dormant.”).
500 WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST. [Vol. 27:461
Furthermore, an argument can be made that Congress’s failure
to take action to correct at least the harmful economic disparity be-
tween African Americans and white Americans—which was caused
by slavery and subsequent racial discrimination in housing patterns
and redlining, and other governmental action in financing and
controlling the location of federally subsidized housing—may be
actionable under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, if such
a claim were available against Congress. The Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals’ decision in NLRB v. Mansion House Center Management
Corp.174 is instructive. First, the Eighth Circuit held that the Equal
Protection Clause is incorporated into the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.175 Therefore, the NLRB, being a federal agency,
could not enforce an order that a company must bargain with a union
that had a history of racial discrimination with continuing effects.176
The court then held that doing so would violate the equal protec-
tion/due process rights of those employees who suffered discrimina-
tion.177 The court stated: “When a governmental agency recognizes
such a union to be the bargaining representative it significantly
becomes a willing participant in the union’s discriminatory prac-
tices. Although the union itself is not a governmental instrumental-
ity the National Labor Relations Board is.”178
Furthermore, Congress, if it had a desire to do so, may be uniquely suited to provide
the type of remedial programs that would be needed to eradicate some of the economic
disparity and hardship that many African Americans suffer in both rural and urban
areas. Dawinder S. Sidhu, The Unconstitutionality of Urban Poverty, 62 DEPAUL L.REV.
1, 56 (2012). One scholar states:
In sum, the economic and physical limitations on the liberty of the urban
underclass, which are traceable in part to racial discrimination and which
disproportionately impact African-Americans and people of color, confer
upon the urban underclass the right to remedial efforts under the Thirteenth
Amendment that will give them the ability to minimally participate in
mainstream society. Those remedies should entail an improvement of the
conditions within the urban environment, especially with respect to
education; strengthened efforts to eliminate discrimination that precludes
mobility; and a recalibration of the federal policies that directly affect the
urban poor, especially the “war on drugs.” The responsibility for the remedy
should reside with Congress because it has significant enforcement power
under the Amendment, resources to implement comprehensive solutions to
a complex and national problem, and the public support to back its conditions-
focused efforts in these areas. Congressional involvement in this area would
not only have the potential to enhance the welfare and lives of many
Americans, but would also help fulfill the promise of an Amendment that
has been heretofore underenforced despite its grand purpose and vision.
Id.
174. NLRB v. Mansion House Ctr. Mgmt. Corp., 473 F.2d 471, 472 (8th Cir. 1973).
175. Id. at 472.
176. Id. at 473.
177. Id.
178. Id.
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Additionally, the court held that a union—with a history of
having practices that racially discriminated against African Ameri-
can workers—could not continue those practices even if the union
did not have any present racial animus.179 The court held that the
union had to take affirmative actions to eradicate the present effects
of the historical racial discrimination that was having present
effects on African American’s participation in the union.180
In imposing a duty on the union to correct the present effects of
its former intentional discriminatory practices, the court referenced
Green v. County School Board Of New Kent County.181 There, the
Court held that a local government’s school plan, which intention-
ally created a dual system of segregated schools, did not provide
equal protection despite that the schools currently had a “freedom
of choice” school assignment plan—given that there still were cur-
rent effects from the former plan’s segregated school system.182
The bottom line of Mansion House Center and Green is that
affirmative steps must be taken to eradicate the present effects of
former racial discrimination; and the failure to do so—when the
present system is perpetuating, reinforcing, and rejuvenating the
former discrimination—establishes complicity in the denial of equal
protection and is violative of the Equal Protection Clause and the
Due Process Clause.
When this principle is applied to the U.S. Congress, one could
argue that, despite Congress’s immense authority under section 2
of the Thirteenth Amendment, it has done little to enhance the
economic conditions of African Americans and other minorities, even
though such substantial economic disparity, when compared to the
wealth of white Americans, stems from hundreds of years of Ameri-
can slavery and the post-slavery racial discrimination that many
States, their white population, and certain federal agencies used to
continue a near-slavery society where former slaves and their
descendants were kept in an inferior, second-class citizenship in
their social, political, and economic positions in this country. Just
like the federal agency was complicit with the union’s discrimina-
tion in Mansion House Center and the school system’s new “‘freedom
of choice’ plan” in Green was complicit with the system’s former racial
discrimination,183 Congress is complicit due to its failure to use its
179. Id. at 477.
180. Mansion House Ctr. Mgmt. Corp., 473 F.2d at 477.
181. Id. at 476–77 (citing Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of New Kent Cnty., 391 U.S. 430
(1968)).
182. Green, 391 U.S. at 439–42.
183. Mansion House Ctr. Mgmt. Corp., 473 F.2d at 477; Green, 391 U.S. at 441.
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section 2 authority to improve the economic condition of African
Americans and other minorities.
Although there may be no legal recourse against Congress for
its failure to act in this respect, as the Court will probably say that
such matters involve political questions that are not justiciable,184
the most logical legal consequence that should flow from Congress’s
inaction is that the Court, when interpreting section 1 of the Thir-
teenth Amendment, should not use the potentiality of Congress’s
section 2 authority as a rationale for not aggressively interpreting
section 1 and developing precedent for the Amendment that African
Americans and other citizens can use as an avenue to break down
present barriers—that continue to produce the social and economic
disparities with white Americans which stem from slavery and
persistent post-slavery racial discrimination.
Even if one does not accept the argument that Congress’s inaction
has made it complicit in the current effects that African Americans
and other minorities experience from centuries of racial discrimina-
tion, he or she should be receptive to an argument that, in the face
of such inaction, aggrieved persons should not be blamed for trying
to use the Constitution itself to obtain any permissible remedy,
including using the Thirteenth Amendment.
Despite that, in some areas, there is much support for self-help
measures—because some believe in a small government where the
federal government should not provide for all of its citizens’ needs—
such a philosophy should not apply to measures that Congress
needs to enact to eradicate the lingering effects of centuries of
slavery and subsequent racial discrimination, especially when such
eradication probably requires a broad study of and a balancing and
prioritizing of different spending and governmental obligations. But,
even if such a small government philosophy is applied, it would be
just another reason why aggrieved African Americans, other minori-
ties, and supportive white American should be able to challenge
present-day policies and practices that continue to promote histori-
cal and current racial discrimination. And they should be able to
challenge such discrimination by bringing a direct claim under the
Thirteenth Amendment.
184. See Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 194–95 (2012) (discussing the political
question doctrine). It should be noted even States and private corporations can take pro-
active steps to remedy their prior racial discrimination if they meet the strict scrutiny test.
Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 488, 490–92 (1989). Therefore, there is no legitimate
reason to believe that Congress cannot use its section 2 authority to take remedial mea-
sures. The only difference is that rational basis should be used and not strict scrutiny,
unless there is legitimate evidence that Congress was motivated by racial animus in the
action that it took—a racial animus burden shifting approach pursuant to the rational
basis standard that this Article proposes. See text accompanying supra notes 132–42.
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III. NEEDED APPLICATIONS OF THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT
A. Unequal Pay for African Americans, Especially African-
American Females
In 1963, Congress enacted the Equal Pay Act of 1963, which was
supposed to ensure that women earn equal pay for comparable work
that men do.185 However, despite any success that this law has had
for some women, African-American females still earn about sixty-
three percent on the dollar as compared to white men for comparable
work, and this disparity starts early in life and does not end until a
black female’s death.186 There may be many reasons why the dispar-
ity in wages exists between African Americans and white Ameri-
cans, including intentional racism; unconscious racism or implicit
bias; a lack of premarket skills that some African Americans may
bring to the job market;187 African Americans’ alleged failures to
negotiate for better wages; and African Americans’ access to fewer
networking opportunities.188 But, regardless of whether the dispar-
ity is based on racism or some other factor, an aggrieved worker, or
group of workers, who believes that the disparity is because of their
race and that the effect of that disparity is to relegate them to
second-class citizenship, with second-class opportunities, should be
able to challenge the wage disparity by bringing a section 1 of the
Thirteenth Amendment claim. The basis of the claim could be that
the unequal pay denies them equal protection of the law (or opportu-
nity) and is therefore a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment’s
equal protection clause or component, as articulated in this Article.
Because the Thirteenth Amendment prevents private action from
enslaving African Americans, thereby denying them equal protec-
tion, it should also prevent private racial discrimination that rele-
gates them to a system of lower wages that tends to cause them to
185. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).
186. P.R. Lockhart, Tuesday is Black Women’s Equal Pay Day. Here’s What You
Should Know About the Gap, VOX (Aug. 7, 2018), https://www.vox.com/identities/2018/8/7
/17657416/black-womens-equal-pay-day-gender-racial-pay-gap [http://perma.cc/2P74
-KFN2]. This wage disparity exists despite that Congress has enacted Title VII (under
its Commerce Clause powers) and the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (under its Commerce Clause
powers). See Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38 § 2(b), 3(d), 77 Stat. 56, 56–57.
187. See Pedro Carneiro, James J. Heckman & Dimitriy V. Masterov, Labor Market
Discrimination and Racial Differences in Premarket Factors, 48 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2 (2005)
(arguing that a lack of premarket skills may account for some of the disparity in wages
between African Americans and white Americans).
188. See Gowri Ramachandran, Pay Transparency, 116 PA. ST. L. REV. 1043, 1058–59
(2012) (discussing various reasons why a pay disparity exists between African American
employees and white employees).
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be in a lower economic class of citizenship, which has a downward
spiral of bad consequences, including having to live in lower eco-
nomic residential areas, with worse schools and fewer opportunities
for them and their children. The downward spiral of lower economic
opportunities and status was an essential feature of slavery and
post-slavery racial discrimination that attempted to create a system
of “near slavery” that sought, and still seeks, to maintain white
supremacy over African Americans. Admittedly, all acts of wage
disparity might not fall within this downward spiral, but many do.
For example, it is not unreasonable to believe that some long-stand-
ing employer and corporate cultures and practices are more tied to
slavery and long-standing efforts to maintain white supremacy,
including corporations whose buildings and wealth were built on the
backs of slave labor and its financial benefits.
And, where such long-standing history of economic benefits
from slavery exists, aggrieved African Americans, who suffer wage
disparity stemming from that history of slavery involvement, should
be able to bring a direct claim under section 1 of the Thirteenth
Amendment to vindicate and remedy their rights to equal wages for
equal work; or, they should be able to raise the Thirteenth Amend-
ment equal protection clause as an affirmative defense when some-
one challenges an affirmative action plan that an employer uses to
remedy such racial disparity.
For example, a number of banks,189 other corporations, and
universities have acknowledged that they owned slaves or otherwise
benefited from slavery.190 If such institutions still have racially
discriminatory wage structures that disadvantage African-American
men and women, then those aggrieved persons should have access
to a section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment claim. To establish
standing to bring such a claim, the aggrieved plaintiff would have
to show a present injury from the discrimination and that the stat-
ute of limitations has not run on the claim. And, if the claim is by an
aggrieved person challenging an affirmative action plan, then the
employer would have to show—under the Jones-inspired standard
of review for benign racial classification (as articulated in this
189. See David Teather, Bank Admits It Owned Slaves, THEGUARDIAN (Jan. 21, 2005),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/jan/22/usa.davidteather [http://perma.cc/J8YZ
-V6LA].
190. See In re African-American Slave Descendants Litigation, 471 F.3d 754, 757 (7th
Cir. 2006) (dismissing claims against certain companies that were involved with the
slave industry, either through the ownership of slaves or the financing of certain slavery-
related activities); see also Katie Reilly, 3 Ways America’s Elite Universities Benefited
from Slavery, TIME (Nov. 7, 2017 3:19 PM), https://time.com/5013728/slavery-universi
ties-america [http://perma.cc/8YUV-PGJF].
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Article)191—that the claim is rationally related to the obtainment of
equal protection as provided under section 1 of the Thirteenth
Amendment and the challenger would have to show that the benign
plan was solely motivated by racial animus.
If Congress was really using its section 2 of the Thirteenth
Amendment powers, and was really concerned about the wage dis-
parity, it could take sufficient action to eradicate that disparity—at
the very least, it could study the disparity and see whether it is related
to slavery and its incidents, and then take appropriate legislative
action to end the disparity. The fact that Congress has not taken
sufficient action is additional evidence that African Americans and
other minorities cannot really afford to wait until Congress enacts
laws to protect them. Therefore, there should be a right for aggrieved
African Americans and other minorities to bring claims directly under
the Thirteenth Amendment equal protection clause, as reflected in
section 1 of the Amendment.
B. Lack of Reparations (Or at Least the Study of Reparations)
The goal here is not to do a detailed study of or argue for repa-
rations. The focus is to show that Congress, since the end of slavery
in 1865, has not given sufficient attention to the issue, despite repara-
tions being given to others in this country.192 Only recently has there
been a Congressional hearing to discuss the subject, with one mod-
est proposal—that Congress establish a commission to study the
issue—not getting much traction, despite the fact that the Demo-
cratic Party is in control of the U.S. House.193 It should be noted that
the current reparations-related bill pending before Congress is H.R.
40, and it has been introduced every year from 1989 until 2017,
without being passed in either house of Congress.194 It is a bill that
asked only that a commission be created to study the effects of
slavery on current African Americans.195 One would think that in a
country as educationally inclined as the United States that most
Americans would have no problem with at least studying an issue.196
191. See text accompanying supra notes 58–59.
192. See Taryn Luna, California task force will consider paying reparations for slavery,
L.A. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/California/story/2020-09-30/cali
fornia-task-force-reparations-slavery-gavin-newsom-shirley-weber (discussing reparations
to Japanese-Americans because of their interment in camps during World War II).
193. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, At Historic Hearing, House Panel Explores Reparations,




196. For a discussion of reparations, see Stephanie Ebbs, Georgetown University
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One is left to wonder whether the failure to study reparations is just
another act that devalues African Americans; that the failure is
based on racism; that the political leaders believe that no repara-
tions are due because of the civil rights laws that have been enacted;
or that some believe that the opportunity to live in this country is
reparations enough.197
Even if one were to argue that the mere act of freeing the slaves
from years of inhuman treatment is sufficient reparations for slavery,
the continued racial discrimination, after slavery, probably war-
rants additional reparations. Perhaps the political system is work-
ing like it always has worked, or the way that it has become. The
lobbyists and public organizations with influence and money are the
ones that get laws passed that are favorable to them and their
constituencies. In any event, that Congress has not seriously consid-
ered reparations for so many years is just another example that its
section 2 authority should not be used to prevent the Court and
other federal courts from interpreting section 1 of the Thirteenth
Amendment to develop much needed law in this area.
If Congress will not provide for reparations, then perhaps states
and private institutions will. Recently, both Georgetown University
and Princeton University acknowledged their involvements in slavery
and they agreed to pay reparations.198 With private institutions, like
the ones referenced above, there does not appear to be any impedi-
ment to giving reparations because the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment are not applicable.
However, when a state actor or federal actor grants the repara-
tions, a person might lodge a challenge against the reparations under
at least the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause.
Furthermore, one might expect that the Court will conduct its normal
strict scrutiny analysis as performed in Parents Involved in Commu-
nity Schools v. Seattle School District.199 That is, the Court would
Announces Reparations Fund to Benefit Descendants of Slaves Once Sold by the School,
ABC NEWS (Oct. 30, 2019), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/georgetown-university-an
nounces-reparations-fund-benefit-descendants-slaves/story?id=66642286 [http://perma.cc





198. Id.; see also Valerie Russ, Princeton Theological Seminary Pledges $27 Million
Reparations Plan, THEINQUIRER (Oct. 22, 2019), https://www.inquirer.com/news/repara
tions-princeton-theological-seminary-slavery-repent-27-million-20191022.html [http://
perma.cc/5DXF-XQ8M].
199. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 551 U.S. 701, 702 (2007).
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probably apply strict scrutiny and resolve the litigation by consider-
ing whether the giving of reparations serves a compelling state
interest and whether the means are narrowly tailored.200
But, as argued above and throughout this Article, a standard
that is less rigorous than strict scrutiny should be used. And, it
should not be too hard to link many of the disparities that African
Americans currently suffer to either slavery or the racial discrimi-
nation that continued in its aftermath.201
Congress, if it were of the mind to do so, could study and enact
appropriate legislation under section 2 to grant reparations to eradi-
cate the harmful effects of the racial history of this country, and it
could experiment with different methods, including urban develop-
ment, scholarships to African Americans who live in depressed school
districts, and other methods to undo the present effects of hundreds
of years of slavery and another hundred years or so of de jure and
de facto segregation, and other acts of racial discrimination.
But, if Congress does not act, private entities, like Georgetown
and Princeton, should be encouraged to give their own versions of
reparations, and so should state governments.202 They should be able
to use section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment and its lower stan-
dard of review, at least as an affirmative defense to any challenges
to reparations programs.
C. Inadequate Funding of Education
In fiscal year 2016–2017, the total U.S. expenditure on K–12
public education was $736 billion, with the federal government con-
tributing eight percent, the States contributing forty-seven percent
($346 billion); and local government contributing forty-five percent
($370 billion),203 with eighty-two percent or $269 billion of that amount
from local property taxes.204 However, there is a belief that in many
states the poorest school districts receive less funding for education
than richer school districts, although the gap may be narrowing.205
200. See infra Section III.C.
201. See Coates, supra note 196.
202. See Neil Vigdor, North Carolina City Approves Reparations for Black Residents,
N.Y.TIMES (July 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/16/us/reparations-asheville
-nc.html/ [http://perma.cc/PB4D-4R22]; Luna, supra note 192.
203. The Condition of Education, Public School Revenue Sources, IES/NCES, https://
nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indicator_cma.asp [http://perma.cc/9M8R-H373].
204. Id.
205. Lauren Camera, In Most States, Poorest School Districts Get Less Funding, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP. (Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/articles
/2018-02-27/in-most-states-poorest-school-districts-get-less-funding [http://perma.cc/6E
YR-TMBG]. Historically, school districts with high rates of low-income students did not
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There is wide variation in funding from state-to-state, and from
district-to-district within a state.206
However, in the United States, there remains substantial edu-
cational achievement gaps between white students and African-
American students and other minority students, primarily because
of the way in which the funding of public education is distributed.207
receive as many resources, including the number of high-quality teachers, counselors,
and course offerings; however, some believe that there has been a narrowing of the
disparity in funding. Id.
Despite the amount of money spent in the U.S. on K–12 education, U.S. students rank
behind other developed countries in the achievements of its students in math and other
subjects. See Dana Goldstein, ‘It Just Isn’t Working’: PISA Test Scores Cast Doubt on
U.S. Education Efforts, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/03
/us/us-students-international-test-scores.html [http://perma.cc/J627-SU96]; see also Lauren
Camera, U.S. Students Show No Improvement in Math, Reading, Science on International
Exam, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Dec. 3, 2019), https://www.usnews.com/news/educa
tion-news/articles/2019-12-03/us-students-show-no-improvement-in-math-reading-sci
ence-on-international-exam [http://perma.cc/4V8J-DB5T].
206. See Michelle Chen, How Unequal School Funding Punishes Poor Kids: Our
System for Funding Education is Broken, and It’s Hurting Society’s Most Vulnerable,
THE NATION (May 11, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/how-unequal
-school-funding-punishes-poor-kids [http://perma.cc/Q7FX-C6ML]. One writer states:
In other states, concentrated in the South, funding is both inadequate and
stagnant. The worst-funded states also tend to neglect the basic educational
interventions that could close the gaps in academic performance by under-
funding early-childhood education, paying their teachers lower wages, and
failing to tackle high turnover rates and major gaps in staffing levels. The
massive workload on teachers is compounded by low student-to-faculty ratios
that keep children cycling through overburdened schools, overworked teach-
ers, and curricula inadequate for meeting basic state standards—which in
turn results in year upon year of “underperforming” ratings for the district.
Id.
207. One writer states:
On average, school districts serving the largest concentrations of students
of color receive approximately $1,800 less per student in state and local
funding than those serving the fewest students of color, and the differentials
are even greater within states. For example, in Illinois, per-pupil funding
ranged from $8,500 to $32,000 in 2016, with suburban districts in Cook
County outspending nearby Chicago by more than $10,000 per pupil.
The great divide in funding comes largely from reliance on local property
taxes. Districts with higher property values bring in more property tax
revenues and provide correspondingly higher funding for schools than
poorer districts do. States typically offset these disparities to some extent,
but rarely provide an equitable system that can respond to student needs.
Funding disparities are so acute and widespread that lawsuits have been
filed in more than 40 states in an attempt to remedy inequities.
Inadequate school funding derails the future for students already strug-
gling against the odds—intensifying disparities that harm society as a
whole by reducing young people’s capacity to contribute to society. When we
provide adequate funding for resources such as well-prepared teachers and
school leaders, smaller class sizes (especially in the early years), and extended
learning time, we see returns in the form of improved student outcomes.
Jeff Raikes & Linda Darling-Hammond, Why Our Education Funding Systems Are
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There may be multiple reasons for the disparity, but one reason is
the way that local governments’ funding of education is mostly based
on property taxes—with suburban communities with higher property
values being able to collect more property taxes to contribute to public
education.208 In contrast, many urban and other low-income commu-
nities, with lower property values, are less able to contribute ade-
quate money for public education.209 One study showed that “a 10%
increase in per-pupil spending for all 12 years of public school re-
sulted in an increase in 10 percentage points in graduation rates and
a reduction of 6 percentage points in adult poverty rates.”210 And
that a twenty-two percent increase in per-pupil spending “would be
large enough to eliminate the educational attainment gap between
children from low-income and nonpoor families.”211 Clearly, there is
a need for attention towards solving the funding gap between high-
income neighborhoods and school districts and low-income neighbor-
hoods and school districts.212
Given the racial discrimination in housing patterns from redlin-
ing in lending to African Americans and other minorities, it is rea-
sonable to believe that much of the disparity in the local funding of
education can in part be attributed to slavery and subsequent racial
discrimination. In addition to many people just not wanting to live
in the same neighborhood with someone from a different race, the
primary culprit is segregated housing patterns which have been
created by the manner in which the U.S. government has allowed
and contributed to redlining and other racially discriminatory hous-
ing and lending practices.213 One is reminded of the Court’s state-
ment in Jones v. Mayer:
Just as the Black Codes, enacted after the Civil War to restrict
the free exercise of those rights, were substitutes for the slave
system, so the exclusion of Negroes from white communities
became a substitute for the Black Codes. And when racial dis-
crimination herds men into ghettos and makes their ability to
buy property turn on the color of their skin, then it too is a relic
of slavery.214








213. Coates, supra note 196.
214. Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409, 441–43 (1967).
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Therefore, it would appear that Congress, under its section 2
authority, could enact laws to ameliorate the harmful effects stem-
ming from the funding of K–12 public education. It could probably
create a system where the collective pool of property taxes is more
evenly distributed between high-property-value suburban neighbor-
hoods and low-income urban communities, given that such disparity
in property values is probably a relic of slavery and subsequent
racial discrimination. Under the rational relation test that Jones
and lower-level cases have applied to Congressional enactments
under section 2,215 such legislation would probably be upheld under
the Thirteenth Amendment.
However, to date, Congress has not enacted such legislation, de-
spite the substantial detrimental effects that unequal funding of pub-
lic education has had and will continue to have on African Americans.
Such inaction by Congress again shows that it cannot be depended
on to do things that are necessary to really equalize the statuses of
white Americans and African Americans, and other minorities.
This is the reason why the Court needs to develop appropriate
jurisprudence under section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment that
would allow aggrieved African Americans and other minorities to
protect themselves. Instead of developing such jurisprudence, the
Court may have further instilled racial discrimination in the fund-
ing of K–12 education—and the harmful effects that it is having on
African Americans and other minorities—by relying on the Four-
teenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause to resolve educational
policy issues, instead of relying upon the Thirteenth Amendment.
For example, in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle
School District,216 Chief Justice Roberts held that two public school
districts’ school assignments plans—which used race to assign stu-
dents to different schools within the school districts—were a viola-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.217
Despite that the assignment plans were for the benign purpose of
having a certain percentage composition in different schools in the
districts, the Court applied strict scrutiny and held that the schools’
articulated purposes for the plans were not a compelling state
interest218 and that the plans were not narrowly tailored because the
school districts did not show that they had tried non-racial alterna-
tives to achieve their goals.219
215. See, e.g., id. at 440–41.
216. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
217. Id. at 747–48.
218. The Court listed various ways in which the schools district labeled their interests:
“racial diversity, avoidance of racial isolation, racial integration [but] they offer no
definition suggesting that their interest differs from racial balancing.” Id. at 732.
219. Id. at 735.
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In reaching its decision, the Court noted that the school dis-
tricts’ use of race in student assignments was not for a historically
allowable purpose of remedying prior school segregation, given that
the Seattle school system had never been racially segregated and
the Jefferson County School system had already remedied prior
segregation.220 The Court rejected arguments that, because the use
of race was benign, that a lesser standard of review than strict scru-
tiny should be used, in part citing Adarand that strict scrutiny should
be used even when a racial classification is for a benign purpose.221
The problem with the Parents Involved in Community Schools
case is that the Court did not consider the Thirteenth Amendment’s
implications, apparently because the school districts did not offer
the Amendment to support their defense.222 The Thirteenth Amend-
ment connection is that the racial composition in the school districts
that the schools’ assignment plans were trying to change probably
stemmed from the prior segregation in housing patterns that the
Court incorrectly labeled as social discrimination.223 The Court
stated: “But in Seattle the plans are defended as necessary to ad-
dress the consequences of racially identifiable housing patterns. The
sweep of the mandate claimed by the district is contrary to our
rulings that remedying past societal discrimination does not justify
race-conscious government action.”224
The use of the Thirteenth Amendment would have allowed an
evaluation of the housing patterns in the school districts to deter-
mine whether they were based on intentional racial segregation by
the government and private citizens, through the use of redlining,
violence, or other acts of racial discrimination. And, if such racial
discrimination could be traced back to slavery and Black Codes and
Jim Crow laws, then that racial discrimination that led to the segre-
gated housing patterns, that led to the racial imbalance in the Seattle
and Jefferson County School systems, would be a badge and incident
of slavery that Congress could remedy by appropriate legislation
under its section 2 authority.
And, if Congress could remedy such present effects of alleged
societal discrimination under its section 2 authority, but will not do
so, then there should be no reason why state entities, such as the
Seattle and Jefferson County school districts, cannot do so. As the
220. Id. at 720.
221. Id. at 720, 741–42.
222. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 551 U.S. at 710–11 (noting petitioners raised
only a Fourteenth Amendment claim).
223. Id. at 731.
224. Id.
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Court recognized in Jones v. Mayer, as quoted above, such housing
pattern discrimination may be a “relic of slavery.”225
Therefore, when the aggrieved white students in Parents In-
volved in Community Schools filed their Equal Protection Clause
claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, the school districts and
African-American residents of those districts should have raised
section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment as an affirmative defense,
thereby forcing the Court to consider the impact of the Thirteenth
Amendment on the school districts’ use of race to balance students’
school assignments in the relevant school districts.
And, as argued above, the Court should use the same deferen-
tial standards that it uses for Congressional enactments under section
2 of the Thirteenth Amendment—which is whether the asserted
action or law that is designed to eradicate badges and incidents of
slavery is a “rational determination” or is rationally related to the
eradication of a badge and incident of slavery.226 The same deferen-
tial standards should be used when either a private person or state
entity brings a claim directly under the Thirteenth Amendment or
defends a claim against them by raising section 1 of the Amend-
ment, as an affirmative defense, when their actions or programs are
alleged to be a violation of another constitutional amendment.
CONCLUSION
The Court has not engaged in a broad interpretation of section
1 of the Amendment. This Article offers a holistic or structural way
in which an equal protection clause or component can be incorpo-
rated into section 1 of the Amendment. The hope is that such an
incorporation will expand the use of section 1 such that it will one
day have a similar coverage as the Fourteenth Amendment when
interpreting claims of racial discrimination and the use of benign
racial classifications, but that a different standard than strict scru-
tiny will be used. To the extent that the courts will interpret the
Thirteenth Amendment and the other Civil War amendments as
having a singular purpose of providing equal protection to African
Americans and other minorities, there is a possibility that the
interpretation of the Amendment will not be strictly controlled by
trying to determine whether a current act of racial discrimination
or a benign classification involves “badges and incidents” of slavery.
Instead, any act of racial discrimination will be within the Amend-
ment’s coverage, as the Tenth Circuit in Hatch seems to imply.227
225. Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409, 442–43 (1967).
226. Id. at 439.
227. See text accompanying supra notes 156–58.
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As a closing matter, it should be noted that there is nothing
special about the Thirteenth Amendment as a source of legal au-
thority. Both the courts and legal scholars should “free” the Amend-
ment from artificial constraints. In other words, courts should be
willing to apply the Amendment to new situations whenever such
situations fall within the scope of the Amendment, including deter-
mining new applications and interpretations of the Amendment.
Similarly, some legal scholars who write articles on and other-
wise participate in Thirteenth Amendment discourse should “free”
the Amendment from their paternal or maternal instincts to protect
the Amendment from possible erroneous interpretations by conser-
vative justices and judges. Such scholars fear that a conservative
Supreme Court might render conservative precedents that are
contrary to an expansive interpretation of the Amendment. Although
timing is important to all adjudication—and it should certainly be
given its due respect—there is nothing about the Thirteenth Amend-
ment that would necessitate any enhanced consideration of the
timing of litigation. One must be resigned to the reality that the
history of the Supreme Court is one of the Court having made bad
decisions that it frequently corrected in subsequent legal opinions,
some of which the Court rendered decades after the original errone-
ous decision. For example, Plessy v. Ferguson,228 an erroneously
decided opinion, which the Court rendered in 1896 to create the “sep-
arate but equal” doctrine, remained good law for fifty-eight years
until the Court, in Brown v. Board of Education229 in 1954, held that
the doctrine violated the Fourteenth Amendment.230 Surely, few
scholars would argue that Mr. Homer Plessy—instead of filing a
lawsuit to address a then-current act of racial discrimination—
should have waited until 1954 to file his claim (when the statute of
limitations would have probably barred the claim) in hopes of getting
a more liberal or progressive Court in 1954 than existed in 1896
when the Court decided his claim.
One can make similar observations about aggrieved parties who
have asked the Court to interpret the Fourth Amendment to ad-
dress then-existing controversies. For example, the Court’s Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence has gone from an erroneous decision in
Olmstead v. United States231—that the Fourth Amendment did not
228. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 537–38 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Ed.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
229. Brown v. Bd. of Ed., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
230. Id.
231. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
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protect one from a warrantless wiretapping that did not involve a
physical intrusion onto the targeted person’s property—to a later
decision in Katz v. United States232 that the Fourth Amendment does
protect one from a warrantless search if the targeted person had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the relevant activity, even if
there was no physical invasion on his or her property.233 No one today
would suggest that Mr. Olmstead, who was targeted with a warrant-
less wiretapping in 1928, and a subsequent criminal prosecution,234
should have waited until 1967 when the Court in Katz changed its
Fourth Amendment standard to a “reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy” standard.235
In sum, this Article proposes a theory of incorporating an equal
protection clause or equal protection theory into the Thirteenth
Amendment, which cries out for current litigation and Court inter-
pretation of claims by currently aggrieved persons who should not
have to wait for the membership of the Court to change to a more
liberal or progressive majority before such litigation is presented to
the Court.236
232. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), superseded by statute, Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197,
212, as recognized in United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 887 (7th Cir. 1984).
233. Id. at 353.
234. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 455.
235. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring).
236. See Luna, supra note 192.
